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ABSTRACT
The quality of insurance companies is a very significant societal issue. 
Policyholders pay premiums assuming indemnity of their potential losses. It is 
essential that an insurer be able to meet its contractual obligations when a loss occurs. 
An initial public offering provides an infusion of capital and an expansion of resources 
available to a firm. Thus, the objective of this study is to examine the financial and 
operating impacts of initial public offerings during 1980-2000 on insurance 
companies.
Chapter 2 examines changes in operating performance of property/casualty 
insurance companies following initial public offerings. I find that following initial 
public offerings, the underwriting performance, the solvency performance, and the 
overall performance of property/casualty insurers improve while the investment 
performance deteriorates.
Chapter 3 examines whether abnormal returns exist at the time of an IPO for 
insurers. I find that abnormal returns exist at the time of an IPO for property/casualty 
insurers and combined insurers, but not for life insurers. There is a significant 
difference in the abnormal returns between property/casualty companies and other 
randomly selected non-insurers as well as between overall insurers sampled and other 
randomly selected non-insurers. The results indicate that abnormal returns of 
insurance companies are less than abnormal returns of other non-regulated firms.
iii
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Chapter 4 examines whether there is evidence of agency problems at the time 
of an initial public offering. I find that the salaries, bonuses, and total values of annual 
pay packages for formerly privately held stock insurers significantly increases 
following initial public offerings. Therefore, reduced ownership by management 
increases agency costs. I also find that salaries and bonuses of former mutual insurers 
do not significantly increase in the IPO year. This result is evidence that top 
executives of mutual insurers may have already abused their position before 
demutualization.
iv
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In general, insurance companies are categorized as property, casualty, life, and 
health. Property insurance is to protect against financial losses resulting from fire and 
related disasters to property and land. Property insurance also includes disasters to 
ships and cargo. The purpose of casualty insurance is to protect the insured against 
the loss caused by the failure of the insured to act or negligence to a third party 
(Rosman (1997)). Liability insurance is included in the casualty insurance category. 
The insurers make indemnity to a third party for the insured. Life and health 
insurance is to compensate the insured or the beneficiary for the occurrence of death, 
disability, or some other event (Huebner and Black (1982)).
Insurance is provided by basically four types of organizations: stock 
companies, mutual companies, Lloyds, and reciprocal exchanges. Best’s Insurance 
Reports states that a stock insurance company is owned and ultimately controlled by 
its stockholders. Policyholders are customers of the company. They have no interest 
in the company at all. A mutual company is a corporation without capital stock. 
Policyholders are the owners of the company. In mutual organizations, the owner and 
customer functions are merged. A Lloyd’s association is a voluntary
1
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2unincorporated association of individual underwriters. Under each policy issued, 
each individual is responsible for a portion of the liability. Reciprocal exchanges are 
groups of subscribers which can be persons or firms who exchange contracts of 
insurance.
Insurance companies are different from industrial firms. Insurance is a 
regulated industry. The ex ante uncertainty about the firm’s value should be less 
severe for insurers than non-regulated firms resulting from regulatory disclosure. 
Regulators require the management to file easily accessible financial reports. 
Regulators or the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) specify 
minimum capital and surplus balance. Regulators control rates. Moreover, NAIC 
annually calculates the Insurance Regulatory Information System (IRIS) ratios for 
each insurer. A suitable range is set for these ratios. Therefore, regulations restrict 
management choice and help reduce the problems of exceedingly risky and selfish 
behavior of the management (Rahman and Yung (1999)).
The quality of insurance companies is a very significant societal issue. 
Policyholders pay premiums assuming indemnity of their potential losses. It is 
essential that an insurer be able to meet its contractual obligations when a loss occurs. 
An initial public offering provides an infusion of capital and an expansion of resources 
available to a firm. Thus the objective of this dissertation is to examine the financial 
and operating impacts of initial public offerings during 1980-2000 on insurance 
companies.
Chapter 2 addresses the following question: What happens to the operating 
performance of insurance companies following an initial public offering (IPO)? This
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3issue uses property/casualty insurers as samples. Unlike previous studies of operating 
performance of insurance companies (Ambrose and Seward (1988), BarNiv and 
Hershbarger (1990), Doherty and Garven (1993), and Pottier (1998)) that study only 
operating performance in the solvency perspective, the examined performances in this 
study are divided into five categories: underwriting performance, investment 
performance, solvency performance, overall operating performance, and overall 
performance.
Chapter 3 addresses two main questions. (I) Do.abnormal returns exist at the 
time of an IPO for insurers? (2) Is there a significant difference between the abnormal 
returns of insurers and companies in other industries? Unlike previous studies, in 
addition to utilizing the S&P 500 index, NASDAQ index, NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ 
value weighted index, NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ equally weighted index, I also 
calculate an insurance industry index to determine whether abnormal returns exist at 
the time of an IPO.
Seventeen insurance companies have demutualized since 1986, with the largest 
by far occurring in 2000 (Levinsohn (2000)). Although various reasons have been 
provided to explain why insurers go public, agency theory research argues that top 
executives usually try to pursue strategies to gain personal rewards; however, I 
question that top executives make the transition from private or mutual to public 
ownership in order to increase their personal rewards. Therefore, Chapter 4 addresses 
the question whether there is evidence of agency problems at the time of an IPO by 
examining whether top cxecutives’rewards increase materially following initial public 
offerings. This study also sheds light on how CEO compensation changes vary across
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4two kinds of firms that differ in agency characteristics: mutual and privately held stock 
insurance companies.
The organizational plan for the dissertation is as follows. Chapter 2 examines 
the operational performance of property/casualty insurance companies following IPOs. 
Chapter 3 investigates the abnormal returns of life and property/casualty insurers at 
the time of an initial public offering. Chapter 4 examines the benefits of top 
executives following initial public offerings. Chapter S provides conclusions.
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CHAPTER 2
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF PROPERTY/ 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANIES 
FOLLOWING INITIAL 
PUBLIC OFFERINGS
Introduction
Although researchers have long recognized the underperformance of initial 
public offerings, they have focused primarily on the stock return and not operating 
performance impacts. Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) document an abnormal return of 
-13.73% for a sample of 1,598 IPOs issued during 1977-1987. Ritter’ s (1991) 
analysis o f the average holding-period return on common stock for 1,526 initial public 
offerings over the period of 1975 to 1984 indicates that over the 3 years after going 
public, issuing firms substantially underperformed a control sample of similar stocks. 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) find that both initial and seasoned equity offerings 
significantly underperform nonissuing firms for five years after the offering date.
The poor long-run performance of stock returns following an IPO is almost 
universal; it has been substantiated in many countries. Dawson (1987), for example, 
finds market-adjusted performance after one year for Hong Kong, Singapore, and 
Malaysia o f -9.3%, -2.7%, and 18.2%, respectively. Aggarwal, Leal, and Hernandez
5
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6(1993) find three-year market-adjusted returns of -47.0%, -19.6%, and -23.7% for 
Brazil, Mexico, and Chile, respectively. Levis (1993), for a sample of 712 IPOs listed 
on the London Stock Exchange during 1980-1988 find a 14.3% first day return. 
Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994) analyze evidence on the short-run and long-run 
performance of companies going public in 25 countries, and conclude that IPOs tend 
to offer relatively low returns in the long run in all 9 countries for which data are 
available.
Several authors do analyze the operating performance of IPO firms. Jain and 
Kini (1994) attribute the significantly poorer post IPO operating performance to high 
net sales and capital expenditure growth, and therefore cannot be attributed to a lack of 
growth opportunities. Cai and Wei (1997) investigate the operating performance of 
180 IPOs listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange over the period 1971-1992, and find 
that Japanese IPO firms exhibit a significant post-issue decline in operating 
performance measures after adjustment for industry and mean-reversion. Mikkelson, 
Partch, and Shah (1997) find that among 283 American initial public offerings in the 
years 1980-1983 that operating return on assets declines from the year before the IPO 
through the first year of public trading, and financial performance remains steady for 
several years.
Shelor and Anderson (1998) measure the financial performance of real estate 
investment Trusts (REITs) following an IPO. Unlike other researchers, they find that 
there is an increase in return on assets and return on sales, but a decline in total assets 
turnover, in the years following the IPO. The decline in total assets turnover is 
significant when compared to only the IPO year.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7The insurance industry provides a unique environment for studying the effects 
of initial public offerings. Receipts patterns are different from other industries; the 
insurance customers must pay in advance for the insurance service they want to 
receive in the future. It is essential that an insurer be able to meet its contractual 
obligations when a loss occurs. Regulators such as state insurance regulatory agencies 
or the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) provide guidelines to 
assure the solvency of insurers. Browne and Hoyt (1995) note that minimum capital 
and surplus balances, rate regulation, and the filing of annual statements are regulated 
in an effort to maintain insurer solvency. Moreover, NAIC annually calculates the 
Insurance Regulatory Information System (IRIS) ratios for each insurer. A suitable 
range is set for these ratios. As these regulations constrain exceedingly risky business 
management, they reduce uncertainty and mitigate information asymmetry problems 
of insurers (Rahman and Yung (1999)).
Insurance companies are regulated in a different way by each state in which 
they operate. Regulations also differ by type of underwriter. Property/casualty 
insurance rates are state-regulated, while life/health rates are not. Since regulation in 
the insurance industry provides more certainty about true business value and reduces 
information asymmetry, it is interesting to examine whether there is a change in 
operating performance of the more regulated property/casualty insurers following 
initial public offerings. I would expect greater changes in the operating performance 
of property/casualty insurers following initial public offerings.
The insurance industry includes both stock and mutual companies. 
Stockholders receive the profits and incurred losses of underwriting operations.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8Policyholders are customers of the stock companies. In a mutual company, the 
policyholders own and organize the company and are also the customers. A mutual 
company may change to a stock company through demutualization, which transfers 
ownership from policyholders to stockholders.
Panko (2001) notes that an examination of the 2000 life/health edition of A. M. 
Best’s Aggregates and Averages indicates that stock-based life/health insurers have 
better operating performance than mutual companies. Between 1990 and 1999, stock 
companies had higher annual return on revenue than mutuals, 3.34% compared to 
2.03%; return on assets of 0.87% compared to 0.5%; and return on equity of 14.13% 
compared to 9.77%.
Fenske (1985) suggests that demutualization provides several advantages to 
mutual insurers. These are the ability to increase capital, and to offer improved 
executive compensation structures such as stock options and stock bonuses. In 
addition, there is an opportunity for greater diversification, the ability to sell other 
financial products, and the potential of tax savings associated with the Tax Reform 
Act of 1984.
This study examines operating performances among property/casualty 
insurance companies following an initial public offering (IPO) in an effort to 
determine whether there is a change in operating performance following an initial 
public offering. I first discuss costs of going public, and then the reasons why 
companies go public. I present a potential explanation for the poorer post-issue 
operating performance of IPO firms. After I describe the sample, I specify measures
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9of operating performance and describe the hypotheses. I then report the results of the 
study and finally, I present my conclusions.
Costs of Going Public 
A variety of costs are associated with going public. These include agency 
costs, adverse selection cost, administrative expenses, and costs associated with 
disclosure, increased responsibility, and loss of control.
Agency Costs
The reduced management ownership experienced when a firm goes public is 
likely to cause agency problems as described in Jensen and Meckling (1976). An 
agency problem develops at the time an entrepreneur decides to sell part or all of a 
firm to external investors. The resulting ownership separation from operational 
control gives the entrepreneur an opportunity to consume additional perquisites. 
Increased conflicts of interest between entrepreneur and shareholders can cause a firm 
to perform more poorly in terms of both operating performance and stock price than a 
similar firm that management owns and operates.
Adverse Selection Cost
Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) argue that adverse selection is one cost 
of going public. Corporate insiders are likely to have more information about the 
future prospects o f the firms going public than outside investors. This information 
asymmetry makes it hard for outside investors to distinguish between good and bad 
firms.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Asymmetric information causes investors to misvalue firms going public, and 
thus misprice their stock (Leland and Pyle (1977) and Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales 
(1998)). Rock (1986) argues that, because of asymmetric information, uninformed 
investors purchase greater amounts of overpriced stock. To encourage uninformed 
investors to participate, the offering firm must discount the share price.
Administrative Expenses
Going public entails substantial direct costs such as underwriter commissions, 
legal and registration fees, stock exchange fees, and auditing expenses (Sutton and 
Benedetto (1990) and Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998)). A publicly owned 
company must file costly quarterly and annual reports with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) suggest IPO- 
related administrative expenses are highest for small firms.
Disclosure
Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) see loss of confidentiality as another cost 
of going public. The SEC requires companies to disclose information about the 
company and its officers, directors, and major shareholders. Public disclosure of data 
such as details about a company’s future projects or future marketing strategies might 
adversely affect the company’s competitive advantage. There is a variety of personal 
information such as salaries, net worth, stock ownership, and past bankruptcies or 
lawsuits can be easily accessed from SEC filings. The sensitive nature of this 
disclosure is often unpleasant for top executives (Sutton and Benedetto (1990)).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Increased Responsibility
Sutton and Benedetto (1990) argue that going public results in more 
responsibility for management and may call for new management techniques. The 
officers and directors of publicly owned companies have a responsibility to comply 
with SEC regulations and with shareholders’ expectations. The managers must try to 
raise the company’s stock price. Investors will be happy as long as they see the stock 
price increase.
Brigham and Gapenski (1997) argue that security analysts and brokers will not 
follow low-priced or inactively traded stock because trading volumes do not provide 
sufficient commissions. Thus, there is pressure on management to seek earnings 
growth. Managers may choose to reject some projects that could increase the firm’s 
value but may reduce short-term profits. Dilemmas like this cause some public 
companies to go private. Kaplan (1989), Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990), and 
Smith (1990) report that firms that go private generally have better performance. 
Moreover, Sutton and Benedetto (1990) argue that keeping investors and the public 
apprised of current information about the company also requires public relations, 
including providing traditional reports, brochures, and newsletters, which is time 
consuming and expensive.
Loss of Control
Sutton and Benedetto (1990) suggest that companies that receive a lower than 
anticipated IPO stock price are often required to increase the number of shares issued 
to raise the same amount of funds. The result of this increase is a loss o f managerial 
control. Brigham and Gapenski (1997) note that the increased tender offers and proxy
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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fights in the 1990s caused manager anxiety about how to retain control of their 
publicly traded company.
Reasons for Going Public 
Despite these significant costs, there are several benefits of going public. They 
include access to new financing, liquidity and diversification, availability of stock for 
acquisitions, enhanced image and investor recognition, motivating management and 
employees, and exploiting mispricing.
Access to New Financing
Private companies are normally financed by bank loans. Gaining access to 
alternative sources of capital is likely the best reason for going public. Pagano, 
Panetta, and Zingales (1998) analyze the determinants of initial public offerings of 
private Italian firms and find that, upon listing, firms are able both to increase their 
bank loan sources and to negotiate better debt terms.
Liquidity and Diversification
Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) argue that liquidity and diversification 
are major benefits of going public. Shares of private companies have no ready market. 
Stockholders who want to sell have to find buyers. This consumes time and money. 
Even if a buyer is found, the buyer and seller have to negotiate the price. Trading on 
an organized exchange is less expensive for a holder. Listing on a major exchange 
provides liquidity for an initial owner who wants to raise cash from widely dispersed 
investors.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Empirical work by Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Chordia, Roll, and 
Subrahmanyam (2001) shows that the liquidity of a company’s shares is an increasing 
function of trading volume. Roell (1996) documents that the main reason to attract a 
dispersed shareholder base is diversification.
Availability of Stock for Acquisitions
Sutton and Benedetto (1990) suggest that mergers and acquisitions are easier 
among public firms. These common means of corporate expansion, are usually 
financed by the exchange of stock. It is difficult to determine a fair stock value for 
closely held (private) firms. The value of a public company is market determined, 
which makes mergers and acquisitions easier for publicly owned companies than for 
private companies.
Enhanced Image and Investor 
Recognition
Sutton and Benedetto (1990) and Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) argue 
that going public adds more prestige to the companies. A public listing on an 
organized exchange is widely regarded as publicity for the firm. Kadlec and 
McConnell (1994) show that, when OTC traded companies announce their move to 
the New York Stock Exchange, their stock price rises by an average of 5 %. A strong 
equity price in the after market makes suppliers willing to give trade credit. It 
increases job security for workers, and assures customers that the firm will be able to 
provide ongoing product service ( Roell (1996)).
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Motivating Management 
and Employees
Roell (1996) alleges that some firms go public in order to provide a mechanism 
designed to retain and motivate their top management team with share participation 
schemes. He asserts that employees may feel less comfortable working in private 
companies; when they want to quit the companies and need their cash, they have to 
depend on the consideration of the management group.
An efficiently determined stock price is useful for structuring managerial 
incentives. Managers’salaries might be indexed to the stock price (Holmstrom and 
Tirole (1993)) or managers may be given stock options (Schipper and Smith (1986), 
Kroll, Wright, and Theerathom (1993)).
Exploiting Mispricing
Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) hypothesize that when stocks are 
mispriced, firms knowing that other firms in their industry are overvalued have a 
motive to go public (Ritter (1991)). They measure the buoyancy of a market by the 
median market-to-book ratio of Italian public companies in the same industry. They 
find that the likelihood of an IPO is directly related to both the stock market valuation 
and the owners’desire to benefit from sector mispricing.
Potential Explanations for Poorer Post-Issue 
Operating Performance
Jain and Kini (1994) posit three possible explanations for any change in 
operating performance that may be caused by an initial public offering: the agency 
cost theory, the windows of opportunity theory, and the window-dressing theory.
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Agency: Theory
Originally developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), the concept of agency 
theory is well established in the literature. Increased conflict of interests between 
owners and shareholders is assumed to harm performance of a firm, as managers have 
incentives to consume more perquisites. That is, managers may make short-run 
operating decisions that increase their personal benefits but harm shareholders 
(Crutchley and Hansen (1989)).
According to agency theory (Jensen and Meckling (1976)) higher ownership 
retention by managers reduces agency costs. Empirical studies routinely validate 
agency theory. Walkling and Long (1984) find that takeover targets will be more 
likely to resist, lucrative offers if the target firm managers’ personal wealth declines. 
Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) find a direct relationship between manager’s common 
stock holdings and changes in both the total asset return variance and the level of 
financial leverage. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) find that corporate value as 
measured by the Q ratio, suffers among firms where stock ownership is low.
Oswald and Jahera (1991) find that firms with higher inside ownership, 
generally have higher returns. DeGeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) and Holthausen and 
Larcker (1996) find that ownership stake changes result in lower operating 
performance when there is a reverse leverage buy-out. Kroll, Wright, Toombs, and 
Leavell (1997) argue that “ for manager-controlled firms, acquisition announcements 
result in negative excess returns to shareholders. For owner-manager controlled firms, 
such announcements results in positive excess returns.” Brush, Bromiley, and
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Hendrickx (2000) find that when managers hold more stock, the free cash flow effects 
on a firm’s performance is reduced.
With respect to agency theory in initial public offerings, Jain and Kini (1994) 
find a direct relationship between post-IPO operating performance and managers’ 
equity holdings. However, the studies of Mikkelson et al. (1997) and Cai and Wei
(1997) contradict agency theory. Mikkelson et al. (1997) find that neither levels nor 
changes in ownership of officers and directors affect the performance of firms that go 
public. Cai and Wei (1997) find the post-issue deterioration in operating performance 
of 180 IPOs listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange over the period 1971-1992 cannot be 
attributed to reduced managerial ownership.
Windows of Opportunity Theory
The windows of opportunity theory suggests that businesses contemplating an 
IPO attempt to time the issues to take best advantage of investors’ demand for new 
stock (Jain and Kini (1994), Roell (19%), Pagano et al. (1998)). If IPO firms 
successfully time their offerings, one would expect to find both poorer subsequent 
operating performance and lower post-issue stock returns for issuing firms. It is likely 
that the high profitability is unsustainable.
There is substantial empirical evidence supporting the windows of opportunity 
theory. For example, Ritter (1991), using a sample of 1,526 IPOs in the 1975-1984 
period, finds that in the three post-IPO years, these firms significantly under 
performed a size and industry-matched control group. Ritter finds that the initial 
concentrations in volume are most likely related to windows of opportunity. Lemer’s
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(1994) finds that 350 privately held venture backed biotechnology firms went public 
when equity valuations reached relatively high levels.
Loughran and Ritter (1995) document that companies issuing stock during 
1979 to 1990, whether initial or seasoned equity offerings, significantly under perform 
non-issuing firms during the five years after the issue. They argue that the poor 
subsequent performance of issuing firms is consistent with the idea that firms take 
advantage of temporary windows of opportunity by issuing equity when, on the whole, 
they are substantially overvalued. Pagano et al. (1998) find that the likelihood of an 
IPO increases with the industry’s market-to-book ratio. The window of opportunity 
hypothesis is also supported by Raj an and Servaes (1997), and is consistent with 
international evidence on the long-run underperformance of IPOs (Loughran, Ritter, 
and Rydqvist (1994)).
Window-Dressing Theory
The window-dressing theory is based on the idea that managers attempt to 
make their accounting earnings look as good as possible prior to any reporting date, 
leading to an overstatement of pre-issue performance and an understatement of post­
issue performance (Beaver, McNichols, Nelson (2000)). Teoh, Welch, and Wong 
(1998a) suggest efforts among seasoned equity issuers to adjust discretionary current 
accruals and mitigate net income actually result in lower post-issue long-run abnormal 
stock returns and net income. Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998) investigate accruals 
magnitude in the years surrounding an IPO. IPO firms are found to initially have 
higher abnormal earnings and accruals, but long-run earnings and negative abnormal 
accruals are much lower. Rangan (1998) finds results similar to these. Teoh, Welch,
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and Wong (1998b) find that IPOs with the highest IPO year accruals invariably realize 
below-normal stock returns in later years.
Aharony, Lin, and Loeb (1993), however, find little support o f earnings 
management by IPO firms. Earnings management is more likely among small firms 
and firms with more debt. Beaver, McNichols, and Nelson (2000) examine whether 
property/casualty insurance companies understate loss reserves to opportunistically 
increase reported income. They find no evidence that firms manipulate their loss 
reserves to increase earnings prior to offerings.
Data and Sample
The insurance industry provides a unique environment to study the effects of 
initial public offerings. Unlike industrial customers, clients must pay premiums in 
advance of any losses they may or may not incur in the future. The insurer must be 
able to fulfill its obligation when a client suffers a loss. Regulation limits exceedingly 
risky business management, reduces uncertainty, and mitigates information 
asymmetry problems in insurance companies (Rahman and Yung (1999)). Conditions 
are different from those in other industries.
I compare operating performances of property/casualty insurance companies 
during the years immediately before and after an initial public offering (IPO) to 
determine whether there is an operating performance change following the IPO.
The study group consists of insurers that made IPOs between 1980 and 1997 
that can be verified with announcements in the Wall Street Journal Index. The source 
of financial data is Best’s Insurance Reports: Property/Casualty Edition from 1984 to 
2000. The initial sample includes 40 insurers. Firms without data in Best’s Insurance
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Reports for the fiscal year prior to the IPO are eliminated. Details of the final sample 
of 32 insurers are provided in Tables I and 2.
The property/casualty insurance industry experienced sizable negative shocks 
in 1984 and 1992. In these years, insurers did not have enough capital and surplus to 
absorb catastrophic losses. Beaver, McNichols, and Nelson (2000) and Cummins, 
Harrington, and Klein (1991) report that the property/casualty insurance business 
cycle is reflected in the capital shock of 1984. Beaver, et al (2000) and Christensen
(1998) find that natural distress such as Hurricane Andrew, contributes to the negative 
capital shock of 1992.
The earnings performance of insurance companies issuing stock inl984 and 
1992 may be weaker than in other years; if so, these comparison years may skew the 
results so that companies’ post-IPO operating performance would appear to have 
improved. Thus, I eliminate insurers that had IPOs in years 1985 and 1993. I 
compare the operating performance of two groups. The first group, the entire study 
group, has 32 property/ casualty insurers. The control group consists of 24 insurers 
that enacted IPOs in 1980-1983, 1986-1991, and 1994-1997.
Measures of Operating Performance 
For each operating performance measure, the value for the year preceding the 
IPO is compared with the value of the IPO year and the three following years.
Underwriting Performance Measures
The loss ratio is the sum of incurred losses and loss adjustment expenses 
expressed as a percent of premium earned. The loss ratio measures the basic cost of
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TABLE I
Number of Issues Per Year
Year Number of Issues
1980 1
1984 1
1985 1
1986 9
1987 1
1990 I
1991 3
1992 I
1993 6
1995 2
1996 5
1997 1
Total 32
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TABLE 2 
List of Insurers IPO 1980-1997
Property/Casualty Insurers
Name Date Exchange
1. General Re Corporation 1980 Nasdaq
2. New York Marine & General 1984 Nasdaq
3. Nac Re Corporation 1985 Nasdaq
4. Frontier Insurance Group, Inc. 1986 Nasdaq
5. Reliance Group Holdings, Inc. 1986 NYSE
6. Merchants Group, Inc. 1986 Nasdaq
7. Donegal Group, Inc. 1986 Nasdaq
8. Harleysville Group, Inc. 1986 Nasdaq
9. Argonaut Group Inc. 1986 Nasdaq
10. Acceptance Insurance Cos., Inc. 1986 Nasdaq
11. Trenwick Group, Inc. 1986 Nasdaq
12. Navigators Group, Inc. 1986 Nasdaq
13. Meridian Insurance Group, Inc. 1987 Nasdaq
14. Translantic Holdings, Inc. 1990 NYSE
15. Horace Mann Educators Corporation 1991 NYSE
16. State Auto Financial Corporation 1991 Nasdaq
17. Citation Insurance Group 1991 Nasdaq
18. HCC Insurance Holdings, Inc. 1992 Nasdaq
19. Allstate Corporation 1993 NYSE
20. Philadelphia Consolidated Holdings Corporation 1993 Nasdaq
21. TIG Holdings, Inc. 1993 NYSE
22. American Re Corporation 1993 NYSE
23. Old Lyme Holdings Corp 1993 Nasdaq
24. Gryphon Holdings, Inc. 1993 Nasdaq
25. Meadowbrook Insurance Group, Inc. 1995 NYSE
26. Erie Indemnity Corporation 1995 Nasdaq
27. Farm Family Holdings, Inc. 1996 NYSE
28. Highlands Insurance Group, Inc. 1996 NYSE
29. Scor 1996 NYSE
30. Symons International Group, Inc. 1996 Nasdaq
31. Riscorp Corporation 1996 Nasdaq
32. Old Guard Group, Inc. 1997 Nasdaq
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underwriting operations. This is a reflection of underwriting quality. The loss ratio 
can serve as a means to select insurance lines and adequate set premiums (Troxel, 
Bouchie, and Scoles (1995)).
The expense ratio is the underwriting expenses expressed as a percent of net 
premiums written. The expense ratio mirrors the efficiency of an insurer’s operation. 
McNamara and Rhee (1992) argue that an expense ratio decline indicates 
improvement in operational efficiency.
The combined ratio is calculated from three measures: the loss ratio, the 
expense ratio, and the dividend ratio. This ratio gauges an insurer’s underwriting 
performance. Underwriting profit margin equals 100 percent minus the combined 
ratio. Thus the lower the combined ratio, the higher the underwriting profit margin. 
The dividend ratio is the dividends paid to policyholders expressed as a percent of net 
premium earned.
Pinches and Trieschmann (1974) argue that the loss ratio, the expense ratio, 
and the combined ratio are important insolvency predictors. Bom and Viscusi (1994) 
see the loss ratio as the principal measure of insurance profitability. They examine the 
insurance market effects on loss ratio following the tort liability reforms on general 
liability insurance in the 1980s. McNamara and Rhee (1992) compare expense ratios 
before and after demutualization to determine how efficiently the organization is 
functioning. Ambrose and Carroll (1994) use the expense ratio as a life insurer 
insolvency prediction variable. Chamberlain and Tennyson (1998) examine the 
predominance of financial synergies as a motive for merger and acquisition activity in 
the property/liability insurance industry. They use loss and expense ratios as overall
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measures of operating synergies. When consolidation improves economies of scale or 
management, there is a natural reduction in loss or underwriting costs. Doherty and 
Garven (1993) provide evidence supporting a positive relationship between the 
combined ratio and the rate of insolvency.
Investment Performance Measure
The investment yield is the ratio of net investment income expressed as a percent 
of invested assets. Net investment income includes interest, dividends, and rent earned 
net of expenses, but not realized or unrealized capital gains. This ratio does not mirror 
capital gains/losses and income taxes, but it measures the investment performance of a 
company. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners includes this ratio in 
its Insurance Regulation Information System (IRIS). BarNiv and Hershbarger (1990) 
as well as Pother (1998) use investment yield as one of the predictor variables of 
financial distress in the life insurance industry.
Overall Operating Performance 
Measures
The operating ratio is equal to the combined ratio minus investment income 
ratio. The operating ratio includes underwriting and investment operating results. It 
represents underwriting losses and expenses, less investment returns. The operating 
ratio does not express realized and unrealized capital gains or income taxes. An 
operating ratio of less than 100 percent means that a company has profits from 
operating. The lower the combined ratio, the more profit from underwriting and 
investment operating. The investment income ratio is the net investment income 
which includes interest, dividends and real estate income net of investment expenses
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expressed as a percent of net premium earned. NAIC includes this ratio in IRIS. 
Ambrose and Seward (1988) use this ratio as a predictor of insolvency.
Return on revenue is operating income after tax expressed as a percent of net 
premium earned. This ratio gauges operating profitability or the profit margin of an 
insurer. Lamm-Tennant and Rollins (1994) use return on revenue as a proxy for the 
level of earnings in examining whether the level of earnings provides incentive for 
management to exercise income-increasing or decreasing accounting choices. 
Mooney, Cohen, and Shuster (199S) argue that this ratio has become more important 
since NAIC has begun publishing profit margin data by line and by state.
Chamberlain and Tennyson (1998) examine the predominance of financial 
synergies as a motive for merger and acquisition activity in the property/liability 
insurance industry. They use return on revenue as an overall measure of operating 
synergy.
Return on policyholders 'surplus is the ratio of all operating income after taxes 
and realized and unrealized investment gains expressed as a percent of ending 
policyholders’ surplus. This ratio reflects the returns on an insurer’s surplus from all 
sources of income. This is return on equity for an insurer. The higher the return on 
policyholders’ surplus, the more efficiently the insurer is utilizing its own capital. 
Pottier (1998) uses return on policyholders’ surplus as a profitability measure for 
predicting financial distress.
Solvency Performance Measure
Net premiums written to policyholders’ surplus is the ratio of premiums 
written to ending policyholders’ surplus. Policyholders’ surplus represents the assets
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used to cover losses (Troxel, Bouchie, and Scoles (1995)). The net premium written 
to policyholders’ surplus reflects the sufficiency of this buffer, which is a measure of 
solvency. Policyholders’ surplus fluctuates more as the insurance written increases. 
The lower the ratio of net premiums written to policyholders’ surplus, the more the 
surplus can compensate for unexpected underwriting losses. This means the 
probability of insolvency is lower. This ratio is a basic insolvency measure in the 
property/casualty industry (Trieschmann and Pinches (1974), Harrington and Nelson 
(1986), BarNiv and Hershbarger (1990), and Chamberlain and Tennyson (1998)). 
This ratio is included in IRIS ratios.
Changes in Selected Measures
Change in Admitted Assets is the difference between admitted assets at the end 
of the considered year and admitted assets at the end of the year preceding the IPO 
calculated as a percentage of admitted assets at the end of the year preceding the IPO 
McNamara and Rhee (1992) use an increase in admitted assets as an indicator for 
efficiency in their examination of demutualization performance of life insurers. If 
policyholders are not satisfied with company performance after demutualization, they 
might drop their coverage. If relinquished coverage is high enough, insurers may have 
to sell assets to absorb the relinquishment. Therefore, a decline in admitted assets 
implies that operating performance declines after demutualization. Pottier (1998) uses 
the log of admitted assets as one predictor of financial distress.
Change in Policyholders' Surplus is the difference between policyholders’ 
surplus at the end of the considered year and policyholders’ surplus at the end of the
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year preceding the IPO calculated as a percentage of policyholders’ surplus at the end 
of the year preceding the IPO. Policyholders’ surplus is the excess of admitted assets 
over liabilities. Troxel, Bouchie, and Scoles (1995) show that underwriting results, 
investment performance, loss reserve developments, and growth rate impact 
policyholders’ surplus. Policyholders’ surplus is a financial buffer protecting insurers 
from severe variations in investment values and results of operation. Thus an increase 
in policyholders’ surplus is indicative of enhanced operating performance following 
initial public offerings. This ratio is included in IRIS ratios.
McNamara and Rhee (1992) examine capital and surplus to provide evidence 
of the efficiency and expropriation hypothesis. New capital permits product and 
geographic expansion and surplus replenishment. An increase in surplus after 
demutualization would support the efficiency hypothesis. A decrease in surplus may 
result from increasing operating expenses or an increase in voluntary terminations. 
Thus a surplus reduction following demutualization would support the expropriation 
hypothesis.
Chamberlain and Tennyson (1998) examine the predominance of financial 
synergies as a motive for merger and acquisition activity in the property/liability 
insurance industry. They use increases in policyholders’ surplus as an overall measure 
of operating synergies. Change in surplus is used as a measure for predicting 
insolvency in several studies (BarNiv and Hershbarger (1990), Ambrose and Carroll
(1994), and Pottier (1998)).
Change in net premium written is the difference between net premium written 
at the end of the considered year and net premium written at the end of the year
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preceding the IPO calculated as a percentage of net premium written at the end of the 
year preceding the IPO. This ratio gauges the growth of underwriting exposure of an 
insurer. A decline in net premiums written indicates that an insurer may cease to offer 
certain lines of insurance and has financial problems. Thus an increase in net 
premiums written is an indicator that a company has improved operating performance 
following an initial public offering.
Cagle, Lippert, and Moore (1996) show that net premiums written is an 
expression of insurance policy premiums. Policyholders may view an organizational 
change as a sign of efficiency, when fewer cancelled policies and/or greater sales are 
expected. This ratio is included in IRIS ratios. Ambrose and Carroll (1994), Ambrose 
and Seward (1988), Chamberlain and Tennyson (1998), and Pottier (1998) use change 
in net premiums written as a predictor of solvency.
Methodology
The sample is divided into two groups. One group consists of insurers that had 
IPOs between 1980-1997. The other group omits companies enacting IPOs in 1984, 
198S, 1992, and 1993. The measures of operating performance are divided into five 
categories:
• Measures of underwriting performance: the loss ratio, expense ratio, and the 
combined ratio.
• Measure of investment performance: the investment yield ratio.
• Measures of overall operating performance: the operating ratio, return on 
revenue, and return on policyholders’ surplus.
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• Measure of solvency performance: the net premiums written to policyholders’ 
surplus.
• Measures of overall performance using selected measures: changes in admitted 
assets, changes in policyholders’surplus, and changes in net premiums written. 
For each performance measure, the value in the year preceding the IPO is
compared with the value in the IPO year and the values in the following three years 
for both study groups. The results for the entire group and the control group are 
compared to see whether the capital shock years can be the reasons for the difference.
The research methodology follows Kaplan (1989), Smith (1990), Muscarella 
and Vestsuypens (1990), Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993), and Jain and Kini (1994). 
AH use the median change in levels because the mean is particularly sensitive to 
outliers, and operating performance measures may be skewed. Significance tests are 
based on the two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank tests as recommended by Flores (1989).
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1
Ho: There is a significant improvement in underwriting performance of 
property/casualty insurers as measured by the expense ratio, loss ratio, and 
combined ratio between the year’s performance immediately preceding the 
IPOs and the performance in each of the 3 years immediately following the 
IPOs.
Ha: There is no significant improvement in underwriting performance of 
property/casualty insurers as measured by the expense ratio, loss ratio, and 
combined ratio between the year’s performance immediately preceding the 
IPOs and the performance in each of the 3 years immediately foUowing the 
IPOs.
If initial public offerings result in underwriting performance improvements, 
one would expect a reduction in both the costs of loss and underwriting. A reduction
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in the loss ratio would reflect the higher quality of business an insurer underwrites. A 
reduction in the expense ratio would reflect operating efficiency. A reduction in the 
combined ratio, which incorporates the results from both the loss ratio and the expense 
ratio, would indicate that insurers enhance underwriting performance.
Hypothesis 2
Ho: There is a significant improvement in investment performance of 
property/casualty insurers as measured by the investment yield ratio between 
the year’s performance immediately preceding the IPOs and the performance 
in each of the 3 years immediately following the IPOs.
Ha: There is no significant improvement in investment performance of 
property/casualty insurers as measured by investment yield ratio between the 
year’s performance immediately preceding the IPOs and the performance in 
each of the 3 years immediately following the IPOs.
If initial public offerings result in an enhancement in investment performance,
one would expect an increase in the investment yield ratio. An increase in the
investment yield would indicate that an insurer earns more profits on the invested
assets.
Hypothesis 3
Ho: There is a significant improvement in overall operating performance of 
property/casualty insurers as measured by the operating ratio, return on 
revenue, and return on policyholders’ surplus between the year’s performance 
immediately preceding the IPOs and the performance in each of the 3 years 
immediately following the IPOs.
Ha: There is a significant improvement in overall operating performance of 
property/casualty insurers as measured by the operating ratio, return on 
revenue, and return on policyholders’ surplus between the year’s performance 
immediately preceding the IPOs and the performance in each of the 3 years 
immediately following the IPOs.
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If initial public offerings result in operating performance enhancement, one 
would expect a lower operating ratio, an increase in return on revenue, and an increase 
in return on policyholders’ surplus. A lower operating ratio would indicate that an 
insurer improves the combined operation results of underwriting and investment 
performance. An increase in return on revenue indicates that an insurer can get more 
profit from sales made. An increase in return on policyholders’ surplus indicates that 
an insurer can more efficiently use its own funds.
Hypothesis 4
Ho: There is significantly improved solvency as measured by net 
premiums written to policyholders’ surplus between the year’s performance 
immediately preceding the IPOs and the performance in each of the 3 years 
immediately following the IPOs.
Ha: There is no significantly improved solvency as measured by net premium 
written to policyholders’ surplus between the year’s performance immediately 
preceding the IPOs and the performance in each of the 3 years immediately 
following the IPOs.
If initial public offerings improve solvency, one would expect a decline in net 
premiums written to policyholders’ surplus. A reduction in this measure indicates that 
an insurer has less risk in connection with the surplus available to cover losses.
Hypothesis 5
Ho: There is a significant improvement in operating performance as measured 
by changes in admitted assets, policyholders’ surplus, and net premium written 
between the year’s performance immediately preceding the IPOs and the 
performance in each of the 3 years immediately following the IPOs.
Ha: There is no significant improvement in operating performance as measured 
by changes in admitted assets, policyholders’ surplus, and net premium written 
between the year’s performance immediately preceding the IPOs and the 
performance in each of the 3 years immediately following the IPOs.
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If initial public offerings result in improved operating performance, one would 
expect an increase in admitted assets, policyholders’ surplus, and net premiums 
written. An increase in admitted assets would indicate that initial public offerings are 
associated with expansion (McNamara and Rhee (1992)). An increase in 
policyholders’ surplus would indicate that an insurer has more funds to absorb 
unexpected losses, thus protecting against insolvency (Troxel, Bouchie, and Scoles
(1995)). An increase in net premiums written would indicate that an insurer has 
higher sales, and fewer cancelled policies (Cagle, Lippert, and Moore (1996)).
Results
Measures of Underwriting 
Performance
Table 3 in Panel A, shows that the loss ratios for the entire property/casualty 
insurers group decline in the year of an IPO and in the following three years. Only the 
decrease in year 1 is significant (0.10 level).
Panel B indicates that the loss ratio, for the control group also declines in the 
IPO year and the following three years. The declines are significant at the 0.05 level 
in year 0 and at the 0.10 level in year 1; the declines in year 2 and 3 are not significant. 
The loss ratio reflects the quality of business the insurer writes. The lower the loss 
ratio, the higher the underwriting profit margin. Declines in loss ratios mean that an 
insurer improves its underwriting performance in year 1.
Table 3, Panel C indicates that expense ratios for the entire property/casualty 
group decline in years 0,1,2, and 3, but all the decreases are insignificant. In Panel D
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Find A: Loss Ratio For the Entire Property/Casualty Insurers
t= -l t=0 t= l t=2 t=3
Median 75.65 73 65.25 58 62.55
Median change Relative to Year -1 -3.50% -3.78% -1.72% -1.54%
Two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 0.104 0.087* 0.166 0.292
Observations 26 26 26 26 23
Find B; Low Ratio For the Control Group
t= -l t=0 t= l t=2 t=3
Median 76.4 73.48 73.55 74.93 75
Median change Relative to Year -1 -3.82% -3.73% -1.93% -1.83%
Two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 0.05** 0.084* 0.267 0.396
Observations 18 18 18 18 18
F ind C: Expense Ratio For the Entire Property/Casualty Insurers
t= -l 1=0 t= l t=2 t=3
Median 30.3 29.42 29.7 30.13 30.2
Median change Relative to Year -1 -1.44% -0.37% -2.01% -1.77%
Two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 0.388 0.166 0.585 0.134
Observations 26 26 26 26 26
Fanil P: Expense Ratio For the control Group
t= -l t=0 t= l t=2 t=3
Median 29.12 28.7 29.7 30.55 29.88
Median change Relative to Year -1 -1.44% 1.99% 4.91% 2.62%
Two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 0.571 0.486 0.616 0.372
Observations 18 18 18 18 18
Panel E: Combined Ratio For the entire property/casualtv insurers
r= -l t=0 t= l t=2 t=3
Median 105.85 103.2 104.1 101.6 103.55
Median change Relative to Year -1 -2.50% -1.65% -4.02% -2.17%
Two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 0.002*** 0.00*** 0.028** 0.031**
Observations 29 29 29 29 27
Panel F: Combined Ratio For the control grou
t= -l t=0 t= l t=2 t=3
Median 107.42 102.6 101.87 102.45 103.68
Median change Relative to Year -1 -2.82% -3.51% -2.96% -1.80%
Two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.115 0.145
Observations 22 22 22 22 20
•** Significant at 0.01 level 
** Significant at 0.0S level 
* Significant at 0.10 level
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the expense ratio for the control group declines in year 0, and then increases in years
1, 2, and 3. All the changes are insignificant. Expense ratios are not significantly 
different after an initial public offering, which indicates that the efficiency of 
underwriting performance is not significantly affected by initial public offerings.
Table 3, Panel E, shows that the combined ratio for the entire property/casualty 
group declines in the year of the IPO and the following three years. The declines in 
year 0 and year 1 are significant at the 0.01 level. The declines in year 2 and year 3 
are significant at the 0.05 level.
In Panel F, the combined ratio for the control group also declines in years 0,1,
2, and 3. The declines are significant at the 0.01 level in year 0 and year 1. The 
declines in years 2 and 3 are not significant. The evidence on the combined ratio 
declines following initial public offerings indicates that the insurers improve 
underwriting performance following an IPO.
Measures of Investment 
Performance
The results in Table 4, Panel A, show that the investment yield for the entire 
group declines in the IPO year and in each year of the post-issue period. The declines 
are significant at the 0.05 level in year 0; at the 0.01 level in year 1 and year 3; and at 
the 0.10 level in year 2. The results in Panel B show that the investment yield for the 
control group also declines in years 0, 1, 2, and 3. Only the reduction in year 3 is 
significant (at the 0.05 level).
Investment yield measures the profitability of the company’s invested assets. 
The higher the investment yield, the better the investment performance. The decline
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in investment yield following IPOs indicates that insurers’ investment performance 
deteriorates after an IPO.
TABLE4 
Investment Performance Measures
P and A: Investm ent y idd for the entire property/casus ty  insurers
t= -l t=0 t= l t=2 t=3
Median 6.96 6.13 6.2 6.07 5.8
Median change Relative to Year -1 -11.88% -10.92% -12.84% -16.67%
Two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 0.018** 0.010** 0.072* 0.004***
Observations 17 17 17 17 16
Panel B: Investm ent yield for the control G roup
t= -l t=0 t= l t=2 t=3
Median 6.98 6.44 6.5 6.08 5.8
Median change Relative to Year -1 -7.71% -6.88% -12.85% -16.91%
Two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 0.610 0.153 0.241 0.015**
Observations 10 10 10 10 9
*** Significant at 0.01 level 
** Significant at 0.0S level 
* Significant at 0.10 level
Measures of Overall Performance
Results of the analysis of the operating ratio are presented in Table 5, Panels A 
and B. In Panel A, the operating ratio for the entire group declines in the IPO year and 
the following three years. Only the decline in the IPO year is significant (at the 0.0S 
level). In Panel B, the operating ratio for the control group increases in the IPO year 
and the following three years, but again only the increase in the IPO year is significant 
(at the 0.10 level).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
35
TABLES
Overall Performance Measures
P and  A: O pera tine R atio For the entiire propertv/casualtv insurers
t= -l t=0 t= l t=2 t=3
Median 94.87 88.6 92.2 90.4 88.8
Median change Relative to Year -1 -4.11% -0.22% -2.16% -3.90%
Two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 0.028** 0.130 0.124 0.393
Observations 17 17 17 17 16
Pand B: Operating Ratio For the Control Group
t= -l t=0 t= l t=2 t=3
Median 90.27 92.4 92.87 91.2 90.8
Median change Relative to Year -1 2.36% 2.88% 1.03% 0.59%
Two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 0.091* 0.689 0.79 0.760
Observations 11 11 11 11 10
Pand C: Return on Revenue For the entire Property/Caiualty insurers
t= -l t=0 t= l t=2 t=3
Median 5.28 6.6 8.56 8.3 8.25
Median change Relative to Year -1 25.19% 62.45% 57.44% 56.51%
Two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 0.761 0.162 0.078* 0.162
Observations 23 23 23 22 23
Pand Pi Return on Revenue For the Contrd Croup
t= -l t=0 t= l t=2 t=3
Median 4.2 6.27 6.8 7.32 7.58
Median change Relative to Year -1 49.21% 61.90% 74.23% 80.57%
Two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 0.904 0.126 0.171 0.198
Observations 19 19 19 19 19
Panel E: Return on Pdleyholders* Surplus For the entire Property/Casualty Insurers
t= -l t=0 t= l t=2 t=3
Median 8.4 9.51 9.28 12.04 11.88
Median change Relative to Year -1 13.25% 10.47% 43.28% 41.49%
Two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 0.779 0.050** 0.090* 0.184
Observations 29 29 29 29 29
Pand F: Return an Policyholders’ Surplus For the Control Group
t= -l t=0 t= l t=2 t=3
Median 8.52 8 11.47 9.57 11.5
Median change Relative to Year -1 -6.12% 34.59% 12.32% 34.96%
Two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 0.651 0.092* 0.274 0.520
Observations 21 21 21 21 19
*•* Significant at 0.01 level 
** Significant at 0.0S level 
* Significant at 0.10 level
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If I exclude companies that make an IPO in the years 1984, 198S, 1992, and 1993, the 
combined result of the underwriting performance and investment performance changes 
from improving performance to deteriorating performance. The operating ratio 
incorporates results of underwriting and investment operating. The lower the operating 
ratio, the more profit from underwriting and investment operation. The decline in the 
operating ratio in the IPO year provides evidence that the insurers’ operating 
performance improves in the IPO year.
Return on revenue is reported in Panel C of Table S. There is an increase in 
return on revenue for each year relative to year -1 for the entire group. The increase in 
year 2 is significant at the 0.10 level. The increases in year 0, year 1, and year 3 are 
insignificant. Panel D reports the return on revenue for the control group. The return 
on revenue also increases in each year relative to year -1, but none of the increases is 
significant.
The return on policyholders’ surplus for the entire group, presented in Panel E, 
increases in each year relative to the pre-IPO year. The increase in year 1 is 
significant at the 0.05 level; the increase in year 2 is significant at the 0.10 level; and 
the increases in years 0, and 3 are insignificant.
The return on policyholders’ surplus for the control group is reported in Panel 
F. It declines in year 0, and increases in years 1, 2, and 3. The increase in year 1 is 
significant at the 0.10 level. The decrease in the IPO year and the increases in year 2 
and 3 are insignificant. In general, there is an increase in policyholders’ surplus, 
which means that insurers improve operating performance following initial public 
offerings.
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Measure o f Solvency Performance
Table 6, Panel A shows that the net premium written to policyholders’ surplus 
for the entire group declines in the IPO year and in years 1,2, and 3. The decline in
TABLE 6 
Solvency Measures
Net Premium Written to Policyholders’ Surplus For the entire Property/Casualty
Panel A: insurers
t= -l t=0 t= l t=2 t=3
Median 1.52 1.36 1.35 1.35 1.29
Median change Relative to Year -1 -10.21% -10.91% -11.31% -14.72%
Two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 0.030** 0.009*** 0.147 0.161
Observations 30 30 30 30 28
Panel B: Net Premium Written to Policyholders' Surplus For the Control Group
t= -l t=0 t=l t=2 t=3
Median 1.58 1.5 1.49 1.7 1.5
Median change Relative to Year -1 -5.06% -5.80% 7.60% -5.06%
Two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 0.079* 0.014** 0.366 0.227
Observations 21 21 21 21 19
*** Significant at 0 .01 level 
** Significant at 0.0S level 
* Significant at 0.10 level
the IPO year is significant at the 0.05 level. The decline in year 1 is significant at the 
0.01 level, however, the declines in years 2 and 3 are insignificant.
The results in Panel B indicate that net premium written to policyholders’ 
surplus for the control group also declines in year 0, year 1, and year 3, but increases 
in year 2. The declines in years 0 and 1 are all significant at least at the 0.10 level. 
The increase in year 2 and the decline in year 3 are insignificant.
Policyholders’ surplus fluctuates more as the amount of insurance written 
increases. The lower the ratio of net premium written to policyholders’ surplus, the
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greater chance the surplus can compensate for unexpected underwriting losses, and 
thus the less risk to solvency o f the company. There is a decline in net premium 
written to policyholders’ surplus following an IPO, indicating that insurers improve 
solvency performance following an initial public offering.
Measures of Overall Performance 
bv Selected Measures
Table 7, Panel A, shows that the median change in admitted assets for the 
entire group increases significantly in the IPO year and the next three years. All the 
increases are significant at the 0.01 level. Results of the analysis of the change in 
admitted assets for the control group (reported in Panel B) support this conclusion. An 
increase in admitted assets provides evidence of improving performance of 
property/casualty insurers.
Table 7, Panel C, shows that there is a significant increase in policyholders’ 
surplus in the IPO year, and in years 1,2, and 3 for the entire group. All the increases 
are significant at the 0.01 level. The analysis of the control group reported in Panel D 
provides the same conclusion. There is an increase in policyholders’ surplus 
following an IPO, which means that IPOs result in operating performance 
enhancement.
Results of the analysis of net premiums written for the entire group are 
presented in Panel E of Table 7. There is a significant increase in net premiums 
written in the IPO year and in years 1, 2, and 3 for the entire group. All the increases 
are significant at the 0.01 level. The analysis of the control group reported in Panel F 
supports this finding.
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TABLE 7
Selected Performance Measures
Panel A: Total Adndtted Assets For the entire Property/Casulty insurers
t= -l t=0 t= l t=2 t=3
Median 211989 24920S 3268IS 324229 3457893
Median change Relative to Year -1 17.56% 54.17% 52.95% 64.11%
Two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
Observations 31 31 31 31 30
Total Admitted Assets For the Control 
Panel B:_________________ Group _________
t= -l t=0 t= l t=2 t=3
Median 211989 281196 328393 364898 383111
Median change Relative to Year -1 32.65% 54.91% 72.13% 80.72%
Two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
Observations 23 23 23 23 22
Panel C: Policyholders' Surplus For Propertv/Casualt 1 3 3
t= -l t=0 t= l t=2 t=3
Median 54636 93702 108016 114237 125157
Median change Relative to Year -1 71.51% 97.70% 109.09% 129.07%
Two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
Observations
Policyho
Panel D: Group
32 | 32 
den' Surplus For the C
32
‘ontrol
32 31
t= -l t=0 t= l t=2 t=3
Median 55151 100705 108016 114237 125157
Median change Relative to Year -1 82.60% 95.86% 107.14% 126.93%
Two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
Observations 24 24 24 24 23
Panel E: Net Premiums Written For the entire Property/Casualty insurers
t= -l t=0 t= l t=2 t=3
Median 128986 150234 154772 179548 181726
Median change Relative to Year -1 16.47% 19.99% 39.20% 40.89%
Two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
Observations 32 32 32 32 30
Panel F: Net Premiums Written Written For the Control Group
t= -1 t=0 t= l t=2 t=3
Median 134914 188765 170834 256934 223204
Median change Relative to Year -1 39.91% 26.62% 90.44% 65.44%
Two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.001*** 0.00***
Observations 24 24 24 24 22
••*  Significant at 0.01 level
** Significant at 0.0S level
* Significant at 0.10 level
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Conclusions
Hypothesis 1 proposes that there is an improvement in underwriting 
performance of property/casualty insurers as measured by the expense ratio, loss ratio, 
and combined ratio following initial public offerings. The results indicate that insurers 
do improve underwriting performance following IPOs.
Although the expense ratio does not significantly decline, which indicates that 
insurers do not improve expense control, the loss ratio declines significantly, which 
means insurers significantly improve loss control. The combined ratio declines 
significantly, which means that the overall underwriting performance of the insurers 
improves. Analysis of the control group supports similar conclusions.
Hypothesis 2 is that there is a significant improvement in investment 
performance of property/casualty insurers as measured by the investment yield ratio 
following initial public offerings. The results disprove this hypothesis. There is poorer 
performance of insurers following initial public offerings.
Hypothesis 3 posits a significant improvement in overall operating 
performance of property/casualty insurers as measured by the operating ratio, return 
on revenue, and return on policyholders’ surplus following initial public offerings. 
The results indicate that insurers improve overall operating performance following 
initial public offerings. The operating ratio, which incorporates the results of 
underwriting and investment operation, rises; the return on revenue or profit margin of 
the insurers increases; and the return on policyholders’ surplus, which reflects how 
efficiently insurers use their own funds, also increases.
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Hypothesis 4 is that there is a significant improvement in operating 
performance as measured by admitted assets, policyholders’ surplus, and net 
premiums written following initial public offerings. The results confirm this 
hypothesis. There is a significant increase in admitted assets, which means that IPO 
encourages growth. If there is dissatisfaction with the change in organization form, 
policyholders may terminate their coverage, and insurers may have to liquidate some 
assets to pay nonforfeiture values to the policyholders who are canceling. Therefore, a 
rise in admitted assets is consistent with efficiency (McNamara and Rhee (1992)).
An increase in policyholders’ surplus indicates that an insurer has more funds 
to absorb unexpected losses, thus guarding the company from insolvency (Troxel, 
Bouchie, and Scoles (1995)). An increase in net premiums written indicates that going 
public improves operating efficiency, through higher sales, and fewer cancelled 
policies (Cagle, Lippert, and Moore (1996)).
Hypothesis 5 proposes a significant improvement in solvency as measured by 
net premiums written to policyholders’ surplus following initial public offerings. The 
result indicates improvement in solvency. There is a significant decline in the ratio of 
net premiums written to policyholders’ surplus, which indicates that an insurer has less 
risk in connection with the surplus accessible to assimilate losses.
This paper examines changes in operating performance of property/casualty 
insurance companies following an initial public offering . The results are different 
from other empirical studies that find significantly poorer operating performance for 
industrial firms subsequent to an IPO. Insurance companies are unlike other 
industries. Their customers pay premiums assuming indemnity of potential losses.
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The insurer must be able to meet its contractual obligations when a loss occurs, and 
state insurance regulatory agencies thus provide guidelines to assure the solvency of 
insurers. Regulations serve to mitigate exceedingly risky business management and 
asymmetric information. I hypothesize that there is improved operating performance 
following an insurance company IPO. The results of an empirical examination 
provide evidence that supports the hypothesis. In general, property/casualty insurers 
improve underwriting, overall operating performance, and solvency performance.
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CHAPTER 3
EVENT STUDY OF INITIAL PUBLIC 
OFFERINGS OF INSURANCE 
COMPANIES
Several studies have found that unseasoned common stock issues generate high 
abnormal returns.1 IPO underpricing is a phenomenon of both industrial firms and 
regulated industries such as financial institutions (Alii, Yau, and Yung (1994)) and the 
insurance industry (Rahman and Yung (1999)). Based on the first-day return, Rahman 
and Yung (1999) find that insurers’ IPOs are underpriced by an average of S.l %, and 
Smith (1986) concludes that, on average, underpricing of diverse industries exceeds 
15%. Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1988) report an average initial return across 
industries of 16.37%.
Insurance companies are uniquely regulated. Some states have more stringent 
regulations. Moreover, regulations differ by insurer types. Property/ casualty 
insurance rates are state regulated while life/health rates are not. Since regulation in 
the insurance industry provides more certainty about the true business value and 
reduces asymmetric information (Rahman and Yung (1999)), it is interesting to study 
the effects of regulatory difference by examining the insurance industry. The purpose
1 e.g. Logue (1973), Ibbotson and Jafee (1975), Ritter (1984), Chalk and Peavy (1987), Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens (1989), and Ritter (1991).
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of this paper is to examine life and property/casualty stock prices at the time of an IPO 
and determine whether there is a significant difference in abnormal returns.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: the next section 
describes a potential explanation for the under pricing; the third section presents the 
data and methodology; the fourth section reports the results of an event study; and the 
final section presents the conclusions.
Theories of Underpricing
There are several possible explanations for IPO underpricing. Tinic (1988) 
reviews alternative explanations for underpricing phenomena as Risk-Averse 
Underwriter or Underwriter Price Stabilization Hypothesis, Monopsony-Power 
Hypothesis, Speculative Bubble Hypothesis, Asymmetric Information Hypothesis, and 
underpricing as insurance. Masulis (1987) and Affieck-Graves and Miller (1989) 
argue that regulatory and procedural factors contribute to IPO underpricing. Allen and 
Fauhaber (1989) and Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) suggest that IPO underpricing 
serves as a signal of quality. Fishe (1999) and Boehmer and Fishe (2000) place the 
blame for poor abnormal returns on Flippers.2
Underwriter Price Stabilization 
Hypothesis
The underwriter price stabilization hypothesis is an accepted explanation for 
initial public offerings (IPOs) underpricing. Investment bankers might intentionally 
underprice new common stocks to reduce their underwriting risk as a means of 
decreasing the probability of a failed issue. Mandelker and Raviv (1977) state that
2 Flippers are investors who purchase initial public offering shares and intend to immediately resell 
these shares.
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underpricing is related to an underwriter’s risk aversion. Tinic (1988) argues that this 
hypothesis fails to explain why issuers do not require investment bankers to adjust 
their underwriting spreads to compensate for offering risks. Tinic also states that if the 
main reason for underpricing is the underwriters’ desire to reduce their risk exposure, 
one would anticipate that only IPOs underwritten on a firm commitment basis would 
be underpriced. Ritter (1984) and Chalk and Peavy (1987) indicate that IPOs issued 
with best-efforts contracts are more likely to be underpriced by a greater amount than 
the EPOs underwritten with firm commitment agreements. Rudd (1993) challenges the 
presumption underlying previous findings that positive initial IPO returns result 
basically from deliberate underpricing. He states that positive returns may reflect the 
partially unobserved left (negative) tail in the returns distribution that arises from 
underwriter IPO price support. Rudd also argues that IPOs with zero one-day returns 
subsequently fall in price, suggesting that underwriter price support may account for 
the skewed distribution and hence the phenomenon of positive average initial IPO 
returns, even if offering prices are set at the expected market value. Aggarwal (2000) 
gives considerable support to overselling and selective price support of new offerings. 
He argues that underwriters do not post stabilizing bids to give price support; instead, 
they over-sell shares at the offer price and then cover this short position in the after- 
market Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2000) argue that when the issue is a weak IPO, 
the underwriter basically covers the short position by buying shares in the after- 
market; when the issue is a hot IPO, then the underwriter usually exercises the over­
allotment option or “Green Shoe” to cover the short position. Hanley (1993) explains 
that the offer price is partly adapted to the information about investor demand received
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during the underwriter’s pre-issue information gathering activity. Thus, underpricing 
may serve as a reward for investors who truthfully reveal good information about the 
firms through demand. Accordingly, the more useful the information the underwriters 
receive during the pre-selling activity, the more likely it is that new issues are 
underpriced. Schultz and Zaman (1994) demonstrate that underwriter support is not a 
significant cost, if managed through an overallotment of shares. They find that 
underwriters repurchase large quantities of stock in the aftermarket by overselling the 
issue. If the IPO is successful, the overallotment option is exercised. Otherwise, the 
short position is covered with aftermarket selling. Hanley and Wilhelm (1995) argue 
that institutional investors are regularly favored in the distribution of underpriced new 
issues. However, institutional investors may have to support weaker offerings.
Monopsonv-Power Hypothesis
Generally, large, highly regarded investment banking firms do not underwrite 
common stocks of small, speculative, start-up firms. Ritter (1984) attributes this to 
reputation reasons. Chalk and Peavy (1987) argue that underpricing would be 
available only to the preferred customers who normally do business with the 
investment bank and who pay fees higher than the competitive rates. Ritter (1984) 
argues that the investment banker monopsony power in underwriting common stocks 
of speculative firms may be a reason for underpricing. In summary, the monopsony 
hypothesis holds that the underwriters of unseasoned equities intentionally discount 
the securities. They receive profits by distributing the shares to only favored 
customers because they can share in the price gains.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
47
Speculative Bubble Hypothesis
The speculative bubble hypothesis suggests that the offering prices of new 
common stocks are priced appropriately. However, after-trading speculation drives 
their short-term prices well above their intrinsic value. Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) 
show that IPOs are not initially priced below their intrinsic value, but they are exposed 
to overvaluation or fads in the early aftermarket stage. Tinic (1988) and Ritter (1991) 
also address the possibility of bubbles in the IPO market.
In a related line of research, Delong, Shleifer, Summer, and Waldman (1990) 
study noise traders. Investors normally trade based on rational expectations, but noise 
traders base trades on emotions. Sometimes noise traders are overly optimistic and bid 
prices well above intrinsic values. Sometimes noise traders are overly pessimistic and 
thus reduce prices below intrinsic values. The market transaction price reflects the 
combination of rational trading and noise trading. Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991) 
allege that new offerings are associated with investors’ optimistic emotions. They find 
that when investors are optimistic, they reduce the discount of closed-end funds 
relative to net asset value, while pessimistic sentiments raise the discount. Teoh, 
Wong and Rao (1998) indicate that “cooking” accounting data can cause investors’ 
misassessment.
Stock Flipping Hypothesis
Fohlin (2000) describes Flippers-investors who purchase initial public offering 
shares and intend to immediately resell these shares. This flipping activity can flood 
the aftermarket trading, so underwriters must account for their artificial demand in 
both orders and in determining the offer price. The combination of overselling and
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flipping can cause high initial returns and lower long-run returns. Such behavior 
results from rational optimization, rather than irrational enthusiasm. Krigman, Shaw, 
and Womack (1999), for example, show that flipping is predictable, and there is 
deliberate underpricing. Large traders ‘flip’ IPOs that perform the best in the first day 
but the worst in subsequent months. Fishe (1999) argues that, for IPOs to be 
successful, the underwriter must find sufficient buyers to sell the issue at the offer 
price and determine whether there is additional demand for shares supplied by 
flippers. If there is not enough demand, the after-market price is likely to fall as 
flippers sell. This harms both investors and the issue itself.
Boehmer and Fishe (2000) present the reasons why too much flipping causes 
problems for underwriters. On the other hand, too little flipping restricts after-market 
trading, price movement, and the role of market makers. The stock will be in the 
hands of the public, but will be illiquid. Boehmer and Fishe (2000) find that 
underpricing attracts low-valuation investors who flip shares to higher-valuation 
investors whose access to the new shares might have been rationed. Underwriters 
receive profits from their role as the IPO market makers. Fishe developed the model 
that continues the work of Aggarwal (2000) and Ellis, Michaely and O'Hara (2000) to 
examine how flippers impact underwriter’s choice of an optimal IPO price. Fishe 
argues that the IPO offer price depends on the nature of the issue. A cold IPO is when 
the issue is under-subscribed, while a weak IPO arises if the issue is sold out or 
oversubscribed. For these, flippers cause the after-market price to decrease. A hot 
IPO is over-subscribed but after-market price increases. Fishe shows that flippers
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have the greatest effect on weak IPOs and provides an explanation for underwriter 
price support activities.
Asymmetric Information Hypothesis
Baron (1982) develops an assumption about the asymmetric information 
between issuers and underwriters. Baron assumes that the investment bankers have 
more information than issuers about demand in the capital market. The underwriters 
suggest an appropriate IPO price to the issuers, and then the issuers reward the 
investment bankers by allowing them to sell the securities at a discount. Thus, 
compensation from issuers to the underwriters is a function of the IPO.
In contrast to Baron, Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989a) find no difference 
between the underpricing of self-underwritten initial public offerings and those in 
which the issuing banker does not serve as the lead manager. Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens (1989b) support the asymmetric information hypothesis in an examination 
of the underpricing of second initial public offerings. They find that the second initial 
public offerings are significantly less underpriced than the initial public offerings, 
since investors already have some knowledge about the issues. Schipper and Smith 
(1986) find that the initial returns of equity carved-out is only 1.7 %. This supports 
the information asymmetry hypothesis in that underpricing is smaller when there is 
less uncertainty about the IPO value.
The Winner’s curse model by Rock (1986) is also based on asymmetric 
information. This model attributes IPO underpricing to differences between the 
informed and uninformed investors. Informed investors generally do not subscribe to 
an overpriced new issue, thus the uninformed investors will receive a greater
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proportion of the overpriced issues. When the issues are underpriced, the uninformed 
investors receive full allotment of the less desirable ones. To encourage uninformed 
investors to enter the market, the offering firm must price the issues at a discount, 
which is compensation for this adverse selection. Beatty and Ritter’s (1986) analysis 
supports Rock’s finding that there is a positive relationship between underpricing and 
ex-ante uncertainty. Friedlan (1993) finds that underpricing is inversely related to 
prospectus information and that older firms have higher asset values and revenue. 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) argue that new issues underpricing is a method to 
persuade informed investors to disclose private information about the demand for 
shares in the pre-selling period, therefore helping them understand the offering. 
Moreover, Chemmanur (1993), Jegadeesh et al., (1993) and Spiess and Pettway (1997) 
argue that underpricing provides information to plan future seasoned issues.
In related literature, Carter and Manaster (1990) argue that instead of reducing 
the stock value, low-risk issuers engage more prestigious underwriters. Carter, Dark, 
and Singh (1998) rate underwriters on a ten-point scale based on their Wall Street 
Journal IPO announcement billing. They examine the relationship between the rating 
and the share price and find a negative relationship between underpricing and 
underwriter prestige. Carter and Manaster (1990) and Michaely and Shaw (1994), 
find that issuers with high-reputation underwriters are associated with lower 
underpricing. Jain and Kini (1999) argue that higher investment-banker prestige raises 
the firm’s survival possibility as well. Underwriter reputation can, therefore, take the 
place of underpricing as a means to assure investors.
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Signaling Hypothesis
The signaling hypothesis describes asymmetric information between issuer and 
investors. In general, corporate insiders are likely to have more information about the 
prospects of the firm going public than investors. Because of this, it is harder for 
outsiders to distinguish between high-value and low-value firms. Therefore, high 
value firms have a need to persuade investors that their firms have better value.
Allen and Fauhaber (1989) and Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) argue that IPO 
underpricing is a signal to express the high-value information of the issuing firms to 
investors. After the market discovers the true value, high-quality firms can recover the 
signal cost from a subsequent sale.
Underpricing as Insurance
Tinic (1988) argues that investors lack sufficient information to evaluate 
unseasoned equity issues. Although some operating and financial data are available, 
this is insufficient for investors to judge management quality or to measure the effect 
of the agency cost on the transition from private to public ownership. Issuers cannot 
effectively communicate this information to investors. Investment bankers can 
provide information at lower cost to the investors for the valuation of the shares. Thus, 
the investment bankers’ reputation is at shake by recommending certain issue. The 
SEC requires that managers of an IPO firm do a proper disclosure of every material 
fact that may affect potential investors. The Securities Act of 1933 requires 
investment bankers to manage “due-diligence” investigations to avoid liability not 
only for false or deluding information about the issuer’s prospects but also for 
registration statement omissions. Time (1988) tests the hypothesis that IPOs issued
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after 1993 should exhibit considerably larger excess returns than the issues brought to 
the market before the enactment of the Securities Act. The results indicate that 
underpricing serves as a form of insurance premium against legal liability and the 
associated damages to the reputation of investment bankers.
Regulation Hypothesis
Alii, Yau, and Yung (1994) argue that regulations reduce the asymmetric 
information between the management and investors. Therefore, a regulated company 
provides more information to the public. Regulation is important in determining the 
offering price and the stock’s distribution. Masulis (1987) and Affleck-Graves and 
Miller (1989) suggest that regulatory and procedural factors contribute to the IPO 
underpricing.
Research Hypothesis
Hypothesis 1
Abnormal return exists for life, property/casualty, and other random companies 
at the time of IPOs.
There is a significant difference among the abnormal returns of 
property/casualty insurers, life insurers, and other randomly selected companies which 
have IPOs.
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Data and Methodology
Data
The study group consists of 44 property/casualty insurance companies and 17 
life insurers that enacted IPOs between 1980 and 1999. These are verified with 
announcements in the Wall Street Journal Index and have return data for 250 post IPO 
trading days in the CRSP daily NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ database. Also included 
are 100 randomly selected non-insurers. The list of issuers is presented in Table 8.
Methodology
An event study is used to determine whether there is an abnormal return at the 
time of an IPO for 17 life and 44 property/casualty insurers that enacted IPOs between 
1980-1999. In addition, this study tests the difference between abnormal returns of 
life and property/casualty insurers and compares these to the randomly selected 
companies at the time of the IPOs. This study examines insurance companies that 
trade on the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ. In this study, 251 individual 
daily returns for each company are used to calculate abnormal returns. The date of the 
initial public offering is set to day 0 of the test period.
Measuring Abnormal Returns
Most o f the previous IPO research (Ritter (1984), Tinic (1988), Chalk and 
Peavy (1987), Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989), and Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990)) 
uses the market-adjusted return to measure stock price reaction. Underpricing is the 
difference between the first aftermarket price and the offering price, divided by the 
offering price.
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TABLE 8 
List of Insurers
IPO year
1 Harleysville group Inc NASDAQ 1986 P/C
2 Trcnwick group Inc NASDAQ 1986 P/C
3 Navigators group Inc NASDAQ 1986 P/C
4 Gainsco Inc NASDAQ 1986 P/C
5 Meridian Insurance group Inc NASDAQ 1987 P/C
6 Donegal Inc NASDAQ 1986 P/C
7 Symons International Corp NASDAQ 1996 P/C
8 Merchants Group Inc NASDAQ 1986 P/C
9 Ace ltd NYSE 1993 P/C
10 Fai insurances ltd NYSE 1988 P/C
11 Bancinsurance Corp NASDAQ 1990 P/C
12 State Auto Financial Corp NASDAQ 1991 P/C
13 Mutual Risk Management ltd NYSE 1991 P/C
14 HCC insurance Holdings Inc NASDAQ 1992 P/C
15 American Re Corp NYSE 1993 P/C
16 Allstate Corp NYSE 1993 P/C
17 Penn America Group Inc NASDAQ 1993 P/C
18 Vesta Insurance Group Inc NYSE 1993 P/C
19 American Country Holdings NASDAQ 1993 P/C
20 R T W Inc NASDAQ 1995 P/C
21 American Financial Corp NYSE 1995 P/C
22 Chartwell Re Corp NASDAQ 1995 P/C
23 Farm Family Holdings Inc NYSE 1996 P/C
24 Scor NYSE 1996 P/C
25 Old Guard Group Inc NASDAQ 1997 P/C
26 Meadowbrook Insurance 
Group Inc
NYSE 1995 P/C
27 Erie Indemnity Corp NASDAQ 1995 P/C
28 Argonaut Group Inc NASDAQ 1986 P/C
29 Horace Mann Educators 
Corp New
NYSE 1991 P/C 
P/C
30 Gryphon Holdings Inc NASDAQ 1993 P/C
31 Terra Nova Bermuda 
Holdings ltd
NYSE 1996 P/C
32 20th Century Industries CA NASDAQ 1986 P/C
33 Phoenix Re Corp NASDAQ 1987 P/C
34 Acceptance Insurance 
Holdings ltd
NASDAQ 1986 P/C
35 Paula Financial NASDAQ 1997 P/C
36 Risk Capital Holdings Inc NASDAQ 1995 P/C
37 ITT Hardford Group Inc NYSE 1995 P/C
38 Highlands Insurance Group Inc NYSE 1996 P/C
39 Philadelphia Consolidated Hlg NASDAQ 1993 P/C
40 Citation Insurance Inc NASDAQ 1991 P/C
41 Translantic Holdings Inc NYSE 1990 P/C
42 Prudential Reinsurance NYSE 1995 P/C
43 Reliance Group Holdings Inc 
Hold Inc
NYSE 1986 P/C
44 Meetnic Holdings Inc NASDAQ 1999 P/C
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45 S N L Financial Corp NASDAQ 1997 life
46 Southern Security Life NASDAQ 1992 life
Insurance life
47 Equitable Cos Inc NYSE 1992 life
48 Standard Management Corp NASDAQ 1993 life
49 Reinsurance Group Inc NYSE 1993 life
50 Institute Nazionale Delle Assic NYSE 1994 life
51 Liberty Financial Cos In NYSE 1995 life
52 Guarantee Life Cos Inc NASDAQ 1995 life
53 F B L Financial Group Inc NYSE 1996 life
54 Delphi Financial Group Inc NASDAQ 1990 life
55 Life Re Corp NYSE 1992 life
56 First Alliance Corp NASDAQ 1996 life
57 Amerus Life Holdings Inc NASDAQ 1997 life
58 Nationwide Financial Services NYSE 1997 life
59 Mony Group Inc NYSE 1998 life
60 Manulife Financial Corp NYSE 1999 life
61 Hardford Life Inc NYSE 1997 life
The process to calculate abnormal return:
Ri. =  (PrPo)/Po (1)
Pt = the closing price of the security t trading days after the initial offering.
P0 = the offering price for day 0, or the closing price for the day to the previous 
closing price.
This underpricing measure computes share price appreciation and is not adjusted for 
market returns. To adjust for market returns, the market portfolio return is defined as:
Rmt =  (I,-Io)/Io (2)
lo = the market index value on the offering date.
It = the value of the market index t days after the offering.
The insurer IPOs of this study are traded on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) or NASDAQ. Therefore, the appropriate market indices are the S&P 500 
composite index, the NASDAQ Composite Index, the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Value
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Weighted Index, and the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Equally Weighted Index. The 
market-adjusted returns or abnormal returns, therefore, are expressed as follows:
ARjt= (Rit" Rmt )* 100
where
ARj = abnormal return on security i,
Ri = the raw return on security i
Rm = the return on the market portfolio (the S&P 500 composite index, the 
NASDAQ Composite Index, the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Value Weighted 
Index, and NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Equally Weighted Index, or the industry 
index).
t = 0 is the initial trading day and days 0 to 250 are consecutive aftermarket 
trading days.
Abnormal returns are not explicitly adjusted for systematic risk. This assumes 
that all securities are equally sensitive to market movements and that the distributions 
of new common stocks returns and the index are approximately equal. This implies a 
beta of 1.00. Previous researchers (Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975), Balvers, McDonald, 
and Miller (1988), Chan and Lakonishok (1990), and Clarkson and Thomson (1990)) 
however, argue that the average beta is greater than 1.00. Moreover, Ritter (1991) 
finds that average betas decline following the IPO. Assuming a positive market risk 
premium, IPO betas of 1.00 will provide conservative estimates of IPO 
underperformance (Levis (1990)). Given that this study examines abnormal IPO 
returns among insurers, an insurance industry index is used as a benchmark to 
calculate abnormal returns. All insurers except the 44 property/casualty and 17 life
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insurance companies are included in the index. The mean industry index daily returns 
for day tare:
n
R( = I  RIt/n
t=o
Rjt, (on the first day of trading) is the relative price change from the offer price 
to the closing price. Otherwise, the daily return is measured from one day’s closing 
price to the next. The abnormal return for security i is the difference between the 
return on the security i and the simultaneous return of the industry index. In this 
study, abnormal returns for each of the insurers are calculated, and an average for each 
day is computed from the offering through the next 250 aftermarket trading days.
This study, like Chalk and Peavy (1987), Jog and Riding (1987), Aggarwal 
and Rivoli (1990), Ritter (1991), and Barth, Page, and Jahera (1999), uses a t-test for 
the null hypothesis that the abnormal return is equal to zero and assumes that these 
returns are normally distributed. Brown and Warner (1985) note that the simple t- 
statistic may not be the best in all situations, but it performs reasonably well.
The Wilcoxon statistic is used to measure the difference between the abnormal 
returns of life and property/casualty insurers at the time of the IPOs and the control 
group. Higgins and Peterson (1998) argue that the Wilcoxon test of the null 
hypothesis of no difference in abnormal returns across two groups of independent 
securities is an appropriate statistical measure.
Results
Table 9 reports the average daily returns for the first twenty trading days. The 
average initial return (underpricing) is 1.07% for the full sample of life insurance
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companies with an associated t-statistic of 2.07, which is significant at the 0.0S level. 
The average initial return for the full sample of property/casualty companies is 0.86% 
with a t-statistic of 1.90, which is significant at 0.10 level. The mean initial return for 
the full sample of all insurance companies is 0.91% with a t-statistic of 2.S9, 
significant at 0.01 level. The mean initial return for the control group is 1.50% with 
an associated t-statistic of 3.12, which is significant at the 0.01 level.
TABLE 9
Initial Return of Life, Property/Casualty, Combined 
Insurers, and Random Companies
mean
Life
t sig mean
P/C
t sig
Combined 
mean t sig
Random 
mean t sig
dayO 1.07 2.07 0.0S 0.86 1.90 0.06 0.91 2.59 0.01 1.50 3.12 0.00
day 1 0.08 0.20 0.84 -0.44 -1.40 0.17 -0.30 -1.18 0.24 -0.55 -1.47 0.14
day 2 0.15 0.43 0.67 0.28 0.84 0.40 0.24 0.95 0.35 -0.03 -0.12 0.91
day 3 0.07 0.14 0.89 -0.13 -0.42 0.68 -0.08 -0.30 0.77 0.32 0.91 0.37
day 4 0.00 0.00 1.00 -0.26 -0.63 0.53 -0.19 -0.59 0.56 -0.29 -0.69 0.49
dayS 0.09 0.35 0.73 0.45 1.23 0.23 0.35 1.28 0.21 -0.02 •0.04 0.96
day 6 -0.58 -2.29 0.04 -0.41 -1.29 0.20 -0.46 -1.92 0.06 0.04 0.11 0.91
day 7 -0.23 -0.54 0.60 -0.29 -0.73 0.47 -0.27 •0.88 0.38 -0.06 -0.18 0.86
day 8 0.01 0.02 0.98 0.47 0.93 0.36 0.34 0.90 0.37 -0.25 -0.88 0.38
day 9 -0.31 -0.30 0.77 -0.25 •0.64 0.53 -0.26 -0.67 0.51 -0.08 -0.19 0.85
day 10 0.77 0.71 0.49 0.03 0.09 0.93 0.24 0.62 0.54 -0.31 •0.88 0.38
day 11 0.31 0.56 0.59 0.10 0.38 0.70 0.16 0.66 0.51 0.64 1.96 0.05
day 12 0.22 0.87 0.40 -0.31 -0.92 0.36 -0.17 -0.65 0.52 0.17 0.38 0.70
day 13 0.20 0.37 0.72 -0.11 -0.36 0.72 -0.02 -0.09 0.93 0.36 1.28 0.20
day 14 0.25 0.49 0.63 -0.09 -0.22 0.83 0.01 0.02 0.98 -0.31 -1.38 0.17
day IS 0.31 0.43 0.67 -0.05 -0.24 0.81 0.05 0.18 0.85 0.00 0.01 0.99
day 16 -0.60 -0.93 0.36 -0.06 -0.25 0.80 -0.21 -0.84 0.40 0.11 0.28 0.78
day 17 0.06 0.13 0.90 -0.28 -0.76 0.45 -0.18 -0.63 0.53 -0.22 -0.63 0.53
day 18 -0.20 -0 J7 0.72 0.45 1.59 0.12 0.27 1.05 0.30 0.21 0.51 0.61
day 19 -0.40 -0.83 0.42 0.53 1.69 0.10 0.27 1.01 0.32 0.00 •0.01 0.99
day 20 -0.01 -0.01 0.99 0.18 0.57 0.57 0.13 0.46 0.65 0.46 1.12 0.27
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
59
The daily abnormal return is computed for each of the 44 property/casualty insurance 
companies, 17 life insurance companies, and 100 random companies. An average 
abnormal return for each day from the offering through the first 250 days of 
aftermarket trading is also computed. If the IPO market is efficient, daily abnormal 
returns would not be different from zero. In Table 10, the summary statistics on the 
control group are presented. Consistent with earlier findings, the control group mean 
abnormal returns are not different from zero for the 251 days, except the first trading 
day. The test results indicate that on day 0, the mean abnormal returns for random
TABLE 10
Abnormal Return of Random Companies (Control Group)
s & r  500. NASDAQ. n y s e /a m e x /n a s d a q
Value Wctahted Me*
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAO 
Equally Wdthtcd ladex
NYSE/ NYSE
AMEX/ AMEX
NASDAQ NASDAQ
Valae Eqaally
S4PS0Q t-valae ilg Naidaq t-velee Ug Weighted t-valae dg Weighted t-valae >ig
ladex ladex ladex ladex
dayO 1.26 2.81 0.01 1.33 3.02 0.00 136 3.10 0.00 1.22 2.79 0.01
day t -0.55 -1.47 0.14 -0.44 -1.19 0.24 -0.49 -132 0.19 -0.53 -1.44 0.15
day 2 -0.14 -0.54 0.59 -0.12 -0.46 0.65 -0.29 -131 0.23 -0.08 -033 0.74
day 3 0.19 0.54 0.59 0.26 0.74 0.46 0.06 0.17 0.87 0.20 0.58 0.56
day 4 -034 •0.84 0.40 -0.18 -0.45 0.65 -0.27 •0.66 0.51 -039 -0.96 0.34
day 5 -0.19 -0.53 0.60 -0.10 -0.28 0.78 -0.03 -0.08 0.94 -0.11 -030 0.76
day 6 -0.14 -0.37 0.71 -0.13 -036 0.72 -0.13 -0.36 0.72 •0.10 -0.27 0.79
day 7 -0.15 -0.42 0.68 -0.24 -0.69 0.49 -031 -0.59 0.56 -0.23 -0.67 0.50
day 8 -0.38 -130 0.20 -0.46 -1.64 0.10 -036 -1.24 0.22 -0.50 -1.76 0.08
day 9 -0.04 -0.11 0.91 -0.12 -031 0.75 0.00 -0.01 0.99 -0.14 -038 0.71
day 10 -0.51 -1.51 0.13 -032 -132 0.13 -030 -1.49 0.14 -0.52 -1.55 0.12
day 11 0.59 1.82 0.07 0.58 1.77 0.08 0.60 1.92 0.06 0.53 1.62 0.11
day 12 0.13 0.29 0.77 0.10 032 0.82 031 0.47 0.64 0.02 0.05 0.96
day 13 0.40 1.28 0.20 033 1.05 0.29 033 1.10 037 0 3 2 1.01 0.32
day 14 -0.23 -1.02 031 -030 -130 0.20 -038 -133 032 -035 -1.53 0.13
day IS •0.06 -0.23 0.82 0.01 0.05 0.96 0.03 0.12 0.91 -0.04 -0.14 0.89
day 16 0.13 034 0.74 0.11 030 0.77 0.12 0.31 0.75 0.05 0.14 0.89
day 17 -0.26 -0.68 0.50 -033 -0.62 033 -031 -0.57 037 -032 •0.60 0.55
day 18 0.27 0.64 0.53 032 032 0.61 037 0.92 036 0.19 0.43 0.67
day 19 -0.06 -0.14 0.89 -0.10 -035 0.80 0.02 0.04 0.97 •0.10 -034 0.81
day 20 0.47 1.17 0.24 033 136 0.18 038 0.72 0.47 0.47 1.19 034
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companies using the S&P 500, NASDAQ index, NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Value 
Weighted Index, and NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Equally Weighted Index equals 1.26%, 
1.33%, 1.36%, and 1.22%, respectively. All the mean abnormal returns using the 
S&P 500, NASDAQ index, NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Value Weighted Index, and 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Equally Weighted Index are significant at the 1 % level.
In Table 11, the summary statistics of the life insurers are presented. Contrary 
to previous empirical evidence, the mean abnormal returns of day 0 are not different
TABLE 11
Abnormal Return of Life Insurers
SAP 500. NASDAQ. NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Value Writhtcd ladex
NYSE/
AMEX/
NASDAQ
Value
S4PS00
ladex
t-valae Nasdaq
ladex
t-valae •if Weighted
ladex
t-valae •it
dayO 0.68 130 0.21 0.82 1.48 0.16 0.74 1.39 0.18
day 1 0.02 0.04 0.97 0.16 0.38 0.71 0.04 0.09 0.93
day 2 0.03 0.07 0.94 0.12 032 0.76 0.07 0.17 0.87
day 3 0.17 0.36 0.73 0.07 0.16 0.88 0.13 0.29 0.77
day 4 -0.14 -0.30 0.77 -0.30 -0.62 0.54 -0.18 -0.40 0.70
day 5 -0.18 -0.55 0.59 -0.17 -0.54 0.60 -0.20 -0.64 0.53
day 6 •0.86 -3.26 0.00 -0.76 -2.82 0.01 -0.81 -3.15 0.01
day 7 -0.30 -0.87 0.40 -0.36 -1.00 0.33 -0.31 -0.91 038
day 8 -0.09 -0.24 0.82 0.11 0.25 0.80 -0.02 -0.06 0.95
day 9 -0.61 -0.61 0.55 -0.86 -0.92 0.37 -0.58 -0.59 0.56
day 10 0.73 0.65 0.52 0.65 0.59 0.56 0.73 0.65 0.52
day t t 0.76 1.28 022 0.84 1.45 0.17 0.62 1.09 039
day 12 -0.02 -0.09 0.93 0.03 0.09 0.93 0.12 0.50 0.63
day 13 0.38 0.66 0.52 0.29 0.51 0.61 033 0.58 0.57
day 14 0.31 0.67 0.51 0.49 0.98 0.34 035 0.75 0.46
day IS 0.26 038 0.71 037 0.51 0.62 0.27 0.41 0.69
day 16 •0.86 -1.46 0.16 -1.02 -1.56 0.14 -0.82 -138 0.19
day 17 0.26 0.48 0.64 0.27 0.47 0.64 0.20 037 0.71
day 18 -0.64 -1.18 0.26 -0.78 -1.45 0.17 -0.61 -1.14 0.27
day 19 -0.44 -0.93 037 -0.58 -1.14 0.27 -0.48 -1.01 033
day 20 0.12 0.23 0.82 -0.19 -033 0.75 0.05 0.09 0.93
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TABLE 11 (Continued)
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAO Egaalhr Wrishltd lades. ladaetry lades 
NYSE/
AMEX/
NASDAQ
Equity
Weighted
lades
t-vslae tig ladaslry 
lades
t-valae
dayO 0.82 1.58 0.13 0.77 1.43 0.17
day 1 -0.03 -0.07 0.94 0.02 0.05 0.96
day 2 0.10 0.25 0.81 0.07 0.17 0.87
day 3 0.01 0.02 0.99 0.24 0.57 0.58
day 4 -0.21 -0.51 0.62 -0.18 -0.50 0.62
dayS -0.25 -0.88 0.39 -0.28 -1.10 0.29
day 6 -0.83 -3.37 0.00 -0.66 -2.53 0.02
day 7 •0.42 -1.15 0.27 •0.25 -0.64 0.53
day 8 0.03 0.09 0.93 0.34 0.86 0.40
day 9 -0.62 -0.66 0.52 -0.58 -0.58 0.57
day 10 0.59 0.54 0.60 0.48 0.42 0.68
day 11 0.35 0.65 0.52 0.39 0.74 0.47
day 12 0.13 0.59 0.56 0.12 0.44 0.67
day 13 0.17 0.32 0.76 0.29 0.49 0.63
day 14 0.26 0.54 0.60 0.16 0.33 0.75
day 15 0.26 0.37 0.72 6.44 1.01 0.33
day 16 -0.76 -1.22 0.24 41.78
00Ni 0.22
day 17 0.14 0.25 0.81 0.03 0.05 0.96
day 18 •0.48 -0.91 0.38 -0.42 41.74 0.47
day 19 •0.68 -1.43 0.17 -0.71 -1.65 0.12
day 20 -0.20 -0.37 0.71 -0.05 41.09 0.93
from zero when using the S&P 500, Nasdaq index, NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Value 
Weighted Index, NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Equally Weighted Index, and the industry 
index.
In Table 12, the summary statistics on the property/casualty insurers are 
reported. Consistent with preceding empirical evidence for all the property/casualty 
companies examined, the mean abnormal returns are not significantly different from 
zero for the first 250 days, except day 0. The mean abnormal returns for property/
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SAP SOS. NASDAQ. NYSE/AM EX/NASDAQ Vila* Wcithtcd la te
SAP30S
lades
t-valae •it Nudaq
lades
t-valae •it
NYSE/
AMEX/
NASDAQ
Valae
Weighted
lades
t-valae •it
dayO 0.79 1.78 0.08 0.85 1.97 0.06 0.79 1.84 0.07
day I -0.85 -2.74 0.01 -0.82 -2.94 0.01 -0.80 -2.79 0.01
day 2 0.05 0.17 0.87 -0.15 -0.48 0.63 0.03 0.08 0.93
day 3 •0.46 -1.74 0.09 -0.39 -1.39 0.17 -0.44 -1.65 0.11
day 4 -0.36 -0.96 0.34 -0.39 -1.02 0.31 -0.37 -0.98 0.33
day 5 0.38 0.99 0.33 0.35 0.96 0.34 0.39 1.05 0.30
day 6 -0.64 -2.25 0.03 -0.65 -2.29 0.03 -0.61 -2.17 0.04
day 7 -0.08 -0.20 0.84 0.01 0.01 0.99 -0.06 •0.16 0.87
day 8 0.30 0.59 0.56 0.24 0.48 0.64 0.30 0.59 0.56
day 9 -0.28 -0.67 0.51 -0.41 -0.93 0.36 -0.28 -0.67 0.50
day 10 0.17 0.48 0.63 0.21 0.60 0.55 0.15 0.45 0.65
day 11 0.11 0.38 0.71 0.32 1.04 0 J0 0.15 0.56 0.58
day 12 -0.20 -0.63 0.53 -0.14 -0.45 0.66 •0.17 -0.57 0.57
day 13 -0.24 •0.86 0.40 •0.18 -0.62 0.54 -0.21 ■0.77 0.45
day 14 -0.12 -0.30 0.76 -0.03 -0.08 0.94 -0.09 -0.22 0.83
day IS -0.12 -0.48 0.63 -0.09 -0.39 0.70 -0.11 -0.49 0.63
day 16 •0.08 -0.36 0.72 0.01 0.02 0.98 -0.07 •0.30 0.76
day 17 -0.52 -1.51 0.14 -0.38 -1.04 0.30 -0.47 -1.37 0.18
day 18 0.38 1.36 0.18 0.20 0.76 0.45 0.37 1.37 0.18
day 19 0.45 1.44 0.16 0.45 1.47 0.15 0.42 1.39 0.17
day 20 0.36 1.07 0.29 0.38 1.09 0.28 0.35 1.06 0.30
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NYSE/AM EX/NASDAQ Eoaallv Weighted lades. ladattry lades
NYSE/
AMEX/
NASDAQ
Eqaally
Weighted
lades
t-valae •it 1ladanry
lades
t-valae Kf
dayO 0.79 1.87 0.07 0.84 1.94 0.06
day 1 -0.77 -2.78 0.01 -0.58 -2.01 0.05
day 2 -0.04 -0.14 0.89 0.26 0.88 0.38
day 3 -0.43 -1.64 0.11 2.38 0.92 0.36
day 4 -0.46 -1.28 0.21 -0.32 -0.78 0.44
day 5 0.30 0.84 0.41 0.38 1.06 0.29
day 6 -0.58 -2.06 0.05 •0.49 -1.65 0.11
day 7 -0.09 -0.23 0.82 -0.35 -0.90 037
day 8 621 0.53 0.60 0.44 0.88 0.38
day 9 -0.34 -0.85 0.40 221 0.89 0.38
day 10 0.04 0.14 0.89 0.15 0.50 0.62
day 11 0.12 0.49 0.63 0.18 0.73 0.47
day 12 -0.19 •0.60 0.55 -0.23 -0.79 0.43
day 13 -0.18 -0.65 0.52 5.02 1.40 0.17
day 14 -0.06 -0.16 0.88 -0.11 -0.28 0.78
day 15 -0.09 -0.41 0.68 -0.23 -0.97 0.34
day 16 -0.07 -0.30 0.77 -0.03 -0.14 0.89
day 17 -0.36 -1.03 0.31 -0.28 •0.80 0.43
day 18 0.33 126 0.21 0.30 1.05 0.30
day 19 0.32 1.05 0.30 3.01 1.14 0.26
day 20 0.29 0.91 0.37 0.30 0.92 0.36
casualty insurance companies using the S&P 500 index, NASDAQ index, 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Value Weighted Index, NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Equally 
Weighted Index, and the industry index are equal to 0.79%, 0.85%, 0.79%, 0.79%, and 
0.84% respectively. The test results indicate that in day 0, the mean abnormal returns 
for property/casualty insurers using S&P 500 index, NASDAQ index, 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Value Weighted Index, NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Equally 
Weighted Index, and the industry index are significantly different from zero at the 
10% level.
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In Table 13, the summary statistics on the combination of property/casualty 
and life insurers are reported. Consistent with preceding empirical evidence for all 
companies, the mean abnormal returns are not different from zero for the first 250 
days, except day 0. The mean abnormal returns using the S&P 500, NASDAQ index, 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Value Weighted Index, NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Equally 
Weighted Index, and the industry index are 0.76 %, 0.84%, 0.78%, 0.80% and 0.82% 
respectively. The test results indicate that the mean abnormal returns for the 
combined samples using the S&P 500 index, NASDAQ index, 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Value Weighted Index, NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Equally 
Weighted Index, and the industry index are different from zero at the 5 % level.
From the event study, abnormal returns exists at the time of IPOs for 
property/casualty and the combined samples of life and property/casualty insurance 
companies but not the life insurance firms. Thus, Wilcoxon signed rank test is used to 
examine whether there is a difference between the abnormal returns of property/ 
casualty and the combined samples of insurers and the control group at the time of 
IPOs.
Table 14 shows a significant difference in abnormal returns of 
property/casualty companies and the random companies at the 5% level using the S&P 
500 index, NASDAQ index, and NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Value Weighted Index and 
at the 10% level using the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Equally Weighted Index.
Table 15 shows a significant difference in abnormal return of insurance 
companies and of random companies at the 5 % level using the S&P 500 index,
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NASDAQ index, NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Value Weighted Index, and 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Equally Weighted Index.
TABLE 13
Abnormal Return of Combined Insurers
S&P 540. NASDAQ. NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Valie Weithtcd ladex
s&psoe
lades
t-valae •if Naidaq
lades
t-valae •if
NYSE/
AMEX/
NASDAQ
Valae
Weighted
lades
t-valae •if
dayO 0.76 2.18 0.03 0.84 2.44 0.02 0.78 121 0.03
day 1 -0.61 -2.42 0.02 -0.55 -2.30 0.02 -0.57 -2.40 0.02
day 2 0.05 0.18 0.86 -0.07 -0.30 0.77 0.04 0.15 0.88
day 3 -0.29 -1.24 0.22 -0.26 -1.10 0.28 -0.28 -1.20 0.23
day 4 -0.30 -1.00 0.32 -0J6 -1.20 0.24 -0.32 -1.06 0.29
day 3 022 0.76 0.45 0.20 0.74 0.46 0.22 0.79 0.43
day 6 -0.70 -3.22 0.00 -0.68 -3.14 0.00 -0.67 -3.10 0.00
day 7 -0.14 -0.47 0.64 -0.10 -0.30 0.77 -0.13 •0.44 0.66
day 8 0.19 0.50 0.62 0.20 0.53 0.60 0.21 0.55 0.59
day 9 -0.37 -0.91 0.36 -0.53 -1.31 0.20 -0.36 -0.91 0.37
day 10 0.33 0.82 0.42 0.33 0.85 0.40 0.31 0.80 0.43
day 11 0.29 1.10 0.28 0.47 1.70 0.09 0.28 1.12 0.27
day 12 -0.15 •0.64 0.53 -0.09 -0.39 0.70 -0.09 •0.40 0.69
day 13 -0.07 -0.27 0.79 -0.05 -0.18 0.86 -0.06 -0.25 0.80
day 14 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.12 0.38 0.71 0.04 0.12 0.91
day IS -0.01 -0.05 0.96 0.04 0.13 0.89 0.00 -0.02 0.98
day 16 -0.30 -1.27 0.21 -0.28 -1.07 0.29 -0.28 -1.18 0.24
day 17 -0.30 -1.04 0.30 -0.20 -0.65 0.52 -0.29 -0.98 0.33
day 18 0.10 0.39 0.70 -0.07 -0.30 0.77 0.10 0.39 0.70
day 19 0.20 0.76 0.45 0.16 0.61 0.55 0.17 0.66 0.51
day 20 0.29 1.05 0.30 0.22 0.74 0.46 0.27 0.96 0.34
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NVSE/AMEX/NASPAQ Valat Weighted I r ia .  Iriwlty M w
NYSE/
AMEX/
NASDAQ
Equally
Weighted t-valae 
ladex
eig ladaetry 
ladex
t-valae ><f
dayO 0.80 2.39 0.02 0.82 2.38 0.02
day 1 -0.56 -2.43 0.02 -0.41 -1.72 0.09
day 2 0.00 -0.01 0.99 0.21 0.87 039
day 3 -0.31 -1.34 0.18 1.79 0.95 0.34
day 4 -0.39 • leJ 00 0.17 •0.28 -0.91 037
day 5 0.15 0.54 0.59 0.20 0.73 0.47
day 6 -0.65 -3.04 0.00 -0.54 -2.38 0.02
day 7 •0.18 •0.61 0.54 -032 -1.07 0.29
day 8 0.20 0.54 0.59 0.41 1.09 0.28
day 9 •0.42 •1.08 0.28 1.48 0.79 0.43
day 10 0.20 0.52 0.60 0.24 0.63 0.53
day 11 0.19 0.80 0.43 0.24 1.04 0.30
day 12 •0.10 -0.42 0.67 -0.13 -0.59 0.56
day 13 -0.08 -0.33 0.74 3.70 1.42 0.16
day 14 0.03 0.10 0.92 -0.03 -0.11 0.91
day IS 0.01 0.03 0.98 1.63 0.91 0.37
day 16 -0.26 -1.07 0.29 -0.24 -0.99 0.32
day 17 -0.22 -0.75 0.46 -0.19 -0.65 0.52
day 18 0.11 0.43 0.67 0.10 0.37 0.71
day 19 0.04 0.16 0.88 1.98 1.03 031
day 20 0.15 0.56 0.58 0.20 0.72 0.47
TABLE 14
Compared the Difference of Abnormal Return
Comparison Mean
P/C
Mean
random
index Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank Test
property/casualty-random companies 0.79 126 S&P 0.027
propeity/casualty-random companies 0.85 133 NASDAQ 0.033
property/casualty-random companies 0.79 136 Value Weight 0.033
propeity/casualty-random companies 0.79 132 Equal Weight 0.059
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TABLE 15
Compared the Difference of Abnormal Return
Comparison Mean
Combined Insurers
Mean
random
index Wllcoxoa 
Sinned Rank test
Combined insurers-random 
companies
0.76 1.26 S&P 0.03
Combined insurers-random 
companies
0.84 1.33 NASDAQ 0.016
Combined insurers-random 
companies 
Combined insurers-random
0.78 1.36 Value Weight 0.026
companies 0.80 1.22 Equal Weight 0.04
Conclusions
This study investigates whether there is an abnormal return at the time of an 
IPO for 17 life and 44 property/casualty insurers that enacted IPOs between 1980- 
1999. This study also tests the difference between the abnormal returns of life and 
property/casualty insurers, and compares these abnormal returns to the selected 
companies at the time of the IPOs. There is underpricing of life, property/casualty, 
and the randomly selected non-insurers. However, abnormal returns exist only for 
property/casualty and other companies but not for life insurers. There is a significant 
difference in the abnormal returns between property/casualty companies and other 
randomly selected non-insurers as well as between overall insurers sampled and other 
randomly selected non-insurers. The results of abnormal returns using the insurance 
industry index provides the same conclusion as using other indices including the S&P 
500 index, Nasdaq index, NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Value Weighted Index, and 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Equally Weighted Index. The findings are consistent with 
empirical studies (Alii, Yau, and Yung (1994), Rahman and Yung (1999)) that find 
that regulated firms are less underpriced than non-regulated firms.
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CHAPTER 4
AN EXAMINATION OF THE BENEFITS FOR 
PRIVATELY HELD AND MUTUAL 
INSURERS’ CEOS FOLLOWING 
AN IPO
Introduction
Agency theory focuses on the contract between two parties, which are the 
principal and the agent. The agent receives authority to govern the firm from the 
principal. Since these two parties have different utility functions, it is reasonable to 
believe that an agent will not always act in the best interest of the principal. Thus, 
contracts between the two parties that unreasonably favor the agent will be costly to 
owners (Beatty and Zajac (1994), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Tosi, Katz and 
Gomez-Mejia (1997)).
Much empirical literature supports the idea that senior executives tend to 
pursue strategies that increase their personal benefits at the expense of principals 
(Gomez-Mejia, Tosi, and Hinkin (1987), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Kroll, Wright, 
and Theerathom (1993), Wright, Ferris, Sarin and Awasthi (1996)). For example, 
managers may overinvest in non-value maximizing investments such as corporate
68
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acquisitions (Chung and Wright (1998), Chung, Wright, and Charoenwong (1998)). 
Furthermore, managers may make operating decisions that reduce their personal risk, 
although shareholders may prefer that riskier projects are pursued (Crutchley and 
Hansen (1989)). A number of researchers (Hill and Snell (1989), Kroll, et al. (1993)) 
state that managers prefer to increase firm size because this strategy will enhance their 
benefits and reduce risk for the top executives, even at the expense of the owners. 
Taking these facts together, top managers will likely not exercise the same diligence 
and exert as much effort as the owners would and will try to extract excessive 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits from the owners.
According to Jensen and Murphy (1990), self-serving strategies of top 
managers can be pursued because the incentives of top executives are independent of 
their performance. Their study finds that corporate strategies that increase or decrease 
a firm’s market value by millions of dollars may only minimally affect the financial 
benefits of top executives.
Previous researchers (Fama and Jensen (1983a, 1983b), Fields and Tirtiroglu 
(1991)) argue that different organizational governance mechanisms can be effective in 
controlling agency problems. Effective control of the owner-manager conflict 
discourages senior managers from using resources to serve their self-interests. 
Insurance companies include both stock and mutual insurers. In stock companies, top 
executives are governed by traditional control or governance mechanisms while in 
mutual insurance companies, chief executives have almost total discretion and are 
more likely to act abusively (O’Hara (1981)).
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Various reasons have been provided to explain why companies go public 
(Dannen (1984), Fenske (1985) Tillman m  (1985), and Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales 
(1998)), such as greater access to capital, ease of merging and diversification, 
liquidity, improved image, and enhanced incentives to managers. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) argue that making managers part owners of their firms will reduce 
agency problems. A public corporation can use incentive devices such as share 
options and share bonuses which are unavailable to the mutual firm. However, 
Hetherington (1969) suggests that demutualization may be fostered by the self- 
interests of managers. Through demutualization, managers may be able to convert 
their de facto ownership, which results from the ineffectiveness of the mutual 
policyholder owner, into stock. The stock the managers come to control may represent 
a considerable fraction of the insurer’s net worth.
In this study, from a theoretical perspective, it is questioned whether there is 
evidence of agency problems at the time of insurance company IPOs by examining 
whether top executives’ rewards increase materially following initial public offerings. 
Moreover, this study sheds light on how insurance company executive compensation 
changes following initial public offerings vary across two kinds of firms that differ in 
agency characteristics: mutual and privately held stock insurance companies. These 
answers are both interesting and important since they are unexplored issues. Insight is 
gained as to how senior managers make resource allocation choices driven by their 
self-interests.
I separate the sample into two groups: mutual insurers and privately held stock 
insurers and then examine the different changes in CEOs’ rewards across initial public
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offerings between the two groups. Mutual insurers that demutualize represent the 
group over which the owners (policyholders) have no effective means of corporate 
control prior to their IPOs, while privately held stock insurers represent the group 
whose ownership is reduced when the firm goes public and managers may operate in 
their own-self interest at the expense of new owners.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I 
present the literature on which my hypotheses are based. Then, I describe the sample 
and research methodology. Subsequently, I report the results of the study. Finally, I 
present my discussion and conclusions.
Literature Review and the Development 
of Hypotheses
Insurance companies are predominantly publicly held stock or mutual 
companies. In addition, Lloyds is a syndicate form, but it is not addressed in this 
study. Fama and Jensen (1983b), Hansmann (1985), Mayers and Smith (1981, 1986, 
1988, 1994), and Smith (1986) study the costs and benefits of each organization form 
and the implications of agency theory to different kinds of ownership structure. They 
argue that the unique characteristic of stock insurers is the separation of manager, 
owner and customer. This separation allows increased efficiency through 
specialization. Managerial talent can be selected without considerable thought about 
the wealth of the manager and how much risk the manager is willing to bear (Mayers 
and Smith (1981), and Fama and Jensen (1983b)).
hi publicly held stock insurance companies, top managers are subject to 
traditional control mechanisms. Three types of mechanisms that reduce agency
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
72
problems are the presence of the market for corporate control, the managerial labor 
market, and the capital market. A mechanism that constrains management discretion 
which Manne (1965) first calls the “market for corporate control” is in the form of 
proxy fights, tender offers, and takeover bids (Agrawal and Mandelker (1987), and 
McNamara and Rhee (1992)).
Fama (1980) argues that the managerial labor market provides an effective 
control mechanism. Fama states that managerial labor markets truely reflect available 
information concerning the marginal productivity of managers. How well an 
executive operates the company will affect his/her reputation, which the market will 
use to value his/her human capital. This process which Fama called “settling up” 
provides discipline that makes managers reduce deviations from contracted behavior.
This settling up procedure makes the managerial labor market efficient 
Hence, the owners can be confident that the managers will have the motivation to 
reflect high marginal value to the market and are unlikely to utilize their positions to 
gain personal rewards. Moreover, Kroll et al. (1993) suggests that junior managers 
will force senior managers to achieve higher levels of performance because the market 
will also evaluate their productivity partly on the firm’s productivity. In conclusion, 
Fama and other researchers (Amihud, Kamin, and Romen (1983), and Kroll and 
Johnson (1986), Jensen and Smith (2000)) argue that managers will not abuse their 
positions to diverge from the goal of shareholder wealth maximization, as such action 
will count in the settling up process, thereby reducing the managers’ market value.
The presence of capital markets ensures that stock insurers are monitored by 
institutional investors, other blockholders, and stock analysts. Capital markets can act
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as a force to control management. Managers try to satisfy shareholders’expectations. 
They try to reduce agency costs to receive good performance assessments of 
themselves and their companies in the capital markets (Fields and Tirtiroglu (1991)).
Incentive compensation devices such as stock options and restricted stock 
make the interests of top managers and shareholders congruent (Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), Mayers, Shivdasani, and Smith (1997)). According to Jensen and Smith 
(2000), because the value of stock options increases with stock price variance, options 
motivate the manager to invest in riskier projects. Stock options also help manage the 
under-leverage problem, as managers increase leverage to increase equity volatility 
and thus the value of their options.
At mutuals, the ownership and customer functions are merged. The 
policyholders are both the customers and the owners of the companies. Some 
researchers (Mayers and Smith (1981, 1986, 1988, 1992), Lamm-Tennant and Starks
(1993)) indicate that the more decision authority agents have, the more likely they are 
to consume perquisites at the cost of owners. They argue that mutual managers are 
inclined to have greater decision authority than do stock managers because there is 
virtually no effective market for corporate control in mutual organizations.
The market for corporate control in the form of tender offers and takeover bids 
does not exist in mutual organizations because these have no traded common stock. 
Through a proxy fight, policyholders can remove the existing managers, but they will 
not receive an inordinate share of any resulting gains (Mayers and Smith (1994), 
Wells, Cox, and Gaver (1995)). Proxy fights are much more difficult in a mutual 
ownership situation, resulting in higher costs for policyholders of mutual companies
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versus stockholders o f publicly held firms. For example, courts have ruled that a 
mutual insurance firm can refuse to give a list of policyholders to those initiating a 
proxy fight, even if  the company is reimbursed the cost of producing the roster 
(Meyers and Smith (1986)). Moreover, courts have held that the names of 
policyholders are a proprietary asset of the insurer and thus can be witheld from any 
protestor group (Wells, Cox, and Gaver (1995)). Thus, proxy fights virtually never 
occur among mutual firms (Wells, Cox, and Gaver (1995)). Since one potential 
control mechanism (the tender offer) is impossible (Mayers, Shivdasani, and Smith 
(1997)) and another (the proxy fight) is costly, it is much more difficult to achieve 
effective governance in mutual companies versus stock firms (Mayers and Smith
(1994)).
In addition, mutual insurers are not, from the perspective of capital markets, 
like publicly traded stock companies. With no stock traded, mutuals are not monitored 
by the capital markets. Therefore, top managers of mutual insurers can make 
operating decisions with virtually no threat of outside pressure from either takeovers 
or stockholders. Because of the diffusion of policyholders and because each 
policyholder usually does not have a sufficiently large number of shares to motivate 
active monitoring of management, policyholders appear to be quite disinterested in the 
management of the mutual insurers (Fama and Jensen (1983b), Fields and Tirtiroglu 
(1991), Kroll et al. (1993)). If policyholders are not satisfied with the management of 
the mutual company, they will change companies rather than attempt to remove the 
managers (Kroll, et al. (1993)). Consequently, in mutual organizations, managers
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have nearly total discretion in addition to the opportunity to act abusively (O'Hara 
(1981)).
Kroll, et al. (1993) find that mutual insurers incur general and administrative 
expenses as a percentage of coverage in force at a higher rate than stock insurers. 
They suggest that this is evidence that top managers of mutual insurance companies 
fail to manage their firms efficiently because of the lack of outside pressure.
In spite of the obvious advantages of the mutual structure for the executives of 
such firms, many have chosen to pursue IPOs in recent years ( Levinsohn (2000) and 
Panko (2001)). McNamara and Rhee (1992) report that the basic steps in the 
demutalization process are as follows. A draft of the conversion plan must be 
proposed to the state insurance commissioner. The commissioner analyzes the 
conversion plan and then announces a public hearing. If the commissioner accepts the 
plan, policyholders are informed about the possible change. Policyholders will be 
notified of what they will receive in exchange for their ownership rights. Then the 
policyholders vote on whether they will accept the plan. If a sufficient number of 
policyholders agree to demutualize, the final sanction is accepted, and the company 
can convert.
IPOs are undertaken by both mutual insurance companies, and privately held 
stock insurance companies. When mutuals demutualize, they are allowed to include 
stock options, stock appreciation rights, and restricted stock in the managers' 
compensation packages. Without an effective control mechanism, it is expected that
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top executives of mutual insurers utilize their positions to increase their benefits across 
the demutualization.3
A private stock company has no stock traded on an established exchange and is 
owned by a limited number of shareholders who usually are the entrepreneurs or the 
founders, or their families. According to agency theory (Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
Megginson (1996), Wells, Cox, and Gaver (1995)), when the owner possesses 100 
percent of the company, he/she will be responsible for all the results of his/her 
performance. If the owners consume perquisites such as luxury offices, excessive 
staff, personal airplanes, big cars, or lengthy vacations, these costs are borne by the 
owner. However, when the owner sells a part of his/her firm to outside investors, 
he/she no longer bears the full cost of perquisite consumption. In the case of 100 
percent ownership, the equity agency cost is zero. After an IPO, the original owner’s 
stake is reduced; partial ownership results in the manager’s greater consumption of 
perquisites. This occurs because the sole owner bears the entire cost of the decrease in 
firm value, while the partial owner bears only a portion of the cost of abusive behavior 
(Wells, Cox, and Gaver (1995)).
According to agency theory (see Jensen and Meckling (1976)), reduced 
ownership by managers increases agency costs. Empirical studies provide evidence 
supporting the notion that reduced ownership leads to higher agency costs. For 
example, Walkling and Long (1984) find that a target firm will be more likely to 
oppose an offer if the potential wealth of the firm's management is reduced. 
Mikkelson and Partch (1985) argue that when ownership concentration decreases,
1 Some researchers (Garber, 1986; Dannen.1984, McNamara and Rbee, 1992) argue that regulatory 
control during the conversion process helps to protect policyholders from wealth transfers to managers.
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underlying firm share values fall. Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) report a positive 
relationship between the common stock holdings of managers and the changes in the 
variance of returns on the firm’s total assets and the changes in financial leverage. 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) using Tobin’s q as a valuation measure, find that 
low managerial ownership is associated with low measures of corporate value. 
Oswald and Jahera (1991) examine the relationship between ownership structure and 
financial performance. They report higher excess returns for firms with greater inside 
ownership. Yermack (1996) argues that when officers and directors have more 
ownership, firm market value is significantly higher, although this ownership variable 
has an ambiguous relationship with measures of accounting performance. Kroll, 
Wright, Toombs, and Leavell (1997) argue that acquisition announcements result in 
negative excess returns to shareholders for manager-controlled firms but positive 
excess returns for owner-manager controlled firms. Brush, Bromiley, and Hendrickx 
(2000) argue that firms that have large stock ownership by management mitigate the 
influence of free cash flow on a firm’s performance. Jain and Kini (1994) find a 
significant positive relationship between post-IPO operating performance and equity 
retention by managers. On the other hand, other researchers argue that the ownership 
retention of top managers is irrelevant (Fama and Jensen (1983b), Mikkelson, Partch, 
and Shah (1997)).
Given these earlier findings, it is expected that when privately held stock 
insurers go public, their top executives will increase their salaries and bonuses at the 
expense of the shareholders.
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Hypothesis 1
There will be significant increases found between pre- and post-IPO CEO 
salaries and bonuses for formerly privately held stock insurance companies but 
not for former mutual insurance company CEOs.
Before an IPO, top executives of privately held stock companies may not pay 
themselves as much salary because they are responsible for the full cost of the 
reduction in the value of the firm. According to Gilles (1999), top executives of 
privately held stock companies consider compensation as an expense rather than an 
investment. However, if the top executives increase their compensation after an IPO, 
they will bear only a portion of the full cost. Therefore, I expect top executives’ 
salaries and bonuses for former privately held stock companies to increase. If the 
results support this part of my hypothesis, I will have found evidence to support the 
idea that reduced ownership retention by managers increases agency costs in 
previously privately held insurers.
Since top managers of former mutual insurers are assumed to have previously 
abused their positions, I expect top executives of mutual insurers to already be 
receiving high salaries and bonuses before their IPOs, so after the IPOs they may not 
substantially increase their salaries and bonuses. Thus their salaries and bonuses 
should not significantly increase in the IPO year. If the results support this part of 
Hypothesis 1, then they will suggest agency costs already occur in mutual 
organizations. In effect, I am arguing that form of organization can explain the 
changes in chief executives’ compensation following an IPO.
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Hypothesis 2
For former mutual insurance company CEOs, the pre- and post-IPO changes in 
total values of annual pay packages (including salary, bonus, options, stock 
appreciation rights and restricted stock) will be significant.
Before demutualization, top executives of mutual insurers already likely enjoy
high salaries and bonuses, so after the IPO, they cannot increase their benefits by large
increments in the form of salaries and bonuses. When mutuals demutualize, however,
this allows them access to incentive devices such as stock options, stock appreciation
rights, and restricted stock in the compensation package. Hence, top executives can
enhance their own rewards by increasing their compensation in the form of stock-
based compensation. Given these facts, I predict that the total CEO pre-and post-IPO’
annual pay packages of former mutual insurers will significantly increase.
If the results support Hypothesis 2, then I have some evidence supporting
agency theory- that one of the reasons top executives decide to convert their firms is
to increase their own benefits. These results will also provide evidence about which
strategy top executives of mutual insurers use to increase their own rewards.
Hypothesis 3
For formerly privately held insurance company CEOs, the pre- and post-IPO 
changes in total values of annual pay packages (including salary, bonus, 
options, stock appreciation rights and restricted stock) will be statistically 
significant.
If the results support Hypothesis 3 ,1 will have found evidence to support the 
idea that top executives make the transition of firms from private to public ownership 
to enhance their personal benefits.
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Sample
My sample consists of both a study group and the control group. The study 
group contains 49 insurance companies that initiated IPOs during the years 1986-2000 
that have verified IPO dates in 10K. reports or the Wall Street Journal Index and have 
pre-IPO compensation data available. Nineteen of 49 are mutual insurers while the 
remainder are privately held stock companies. These sample units consist of five 
types of insurers as defined by COMPUSTAT; these are property/casualty (SIC 6331), 
life (SIC 6311), health (SIC 6321), medical (SIC 6324), and surety (SIC 6351). 
Information related to executive compensation is obtained from prospectuses and 
proxy statements. Details about my sample firms are provided in Table 16.
The control group contains 41 non-IPO match-paired insurers. Firms are 
matched on the level of sales in the fiscal year prior to going public, or sales in the 
following one or two years after going public along with the four-digit SIC 
classification. When a match cannot be found among publicly traded insurers with the 
same SIC code, I broaden the search to other SIC code insurers. Details of the 
matched pair firms are reported in Table 17.
Dependent Variables
Dependent variables consist of changes in CEO salaries and bonuses and 
changes in total values of annual pay packages. Total value of annual pay packages 
is the sum of salary, annual bonus, stock appreciation rights, restricted stock, stock 
options, and other compensation. With regard to options, I use the value of
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TABLE 16 
Sample Firms
Panel A: Formerly Privately Held Stock Insurers
No. Company
1 Liberty financial cos
2 FPIC
3 ESG RE LTD
4 Vesta Insurance Group Inc
5 Hartford Financial Services
6 Travelers Aetna Property
7 Allstate Corp
8 ACE limited
9 Renaissancere Holdings Ltd
10 Life Re Corp
11 MMI Cos Inc
12 First Alliance Corp
13 Paula Financial
14 Chartwell Re Corp
15 RTW Inc
16 PMA Capital Corp
17 Rightchoice Managed care inc
18 Everest Reinsurance Holdings
19 Oxford Health Plans Inc
20 Exel Ltd
21 Wellcare Management Group Inc
22 F B L financial Group Inc
23 American Safety Insurance
24 standard Management Corp
25 Terra Nova Bermuda
26 Lasalle Re Holdings ltd
27 United Wisconsin Sevices
28 CNA surety Corp
29 Triad Guaranty Inc
30 PMI group
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Panel B: Form er M utual Insurers
No. Company
1 Farm Family Holdings
2 MUX group
3 Riscorp Inc
4 Scpie Holdings Inc
5 Mony
6 Allmcnca Financial Corp
7 Stancorp Financial Corp
8 Guarantee life Companies
9 NCRIC
10 John Hancock Financial Services
11 Metlife Inc
12 Trigon Healthcare Inc
13 Old Guard Group Inc
14 Wellpoint Health Networks Inc
15 Amerus Life Insureance
16 Meemic Holdings Inc
17 American Physicians Capital Inc
18 Mutual Assurance Inc
19 Unum Corporation
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TABLE 17
Matched-Paired Firms
IPOiMarcrs SIC IPO
Pre-
IPO Match-Paired lasarers SIC
6311I Liberty Financial Cos Inc 6311 1995 1994 Protective life corp
2 FPIC 6351 1996 1995 capitol transamerica corp 6331
3 ESGRELTD 6321 Dec-97 1997 Independence holding corp 6321
4 Vesta Insurance Group Inc 6331 Nov-93 1993 Frontier insurance group 6331
S Hartford Financial Services Group Inc 6331 1997 1996 Berkshire Hataway corp 6321
6 Travelers Aetna Property 6331 1996 1995 Chubb corp 6331
7 ACE limited 6331 1993 1992 Fremont General corp 6331
8 Renaissanccre Holdings Ltd 6331 1995 1994 Argonaut Group Inc 6331
9 MMICosInc 6351 1993 1992 Mbia 6351
10 First Alliance Corp 6311 1996 1995 Southern Sec Life Insurance 6311
II Paula Financial 6331 1997 1996 IPC holdings corp 6331
12 Chartwell Re Corp 6311 1995 1994 Danielson 6331
13 RTWInc 6331 1995 1994 Gainsco inc 6331
14 PM A Capital Corp 6331 1998 1997 Commerce group inc 6331
IS Rightchoice Managed care inc 6324 1994 1993 Maxicare Health Plans 6324
16 Everest Reinsurance Corp 6331 Oct-95 1995 Bcrkly (WR) Corp 6331
17 Wellcare Management Group Inc 6324 1993 1992 Amwest Insurance group 6351
18 F B L financial Group Inc 6311 1996 1995 Midland corp 6331
19 American Safety Insurance 6331 1998 1997 Accel international corp 6331
20 standard Management Corp 6311 1993 1992 Citizens Inc 6311
21 Terra Nova Bermuda 6331 1996 1995 Acceptance insurance group 6331
22 Lasalle Re Holdings ltd 6331 1995 1994 Meridian Insurance Group Inc 6331
23 United Wisconsin Scvices 6324 Oct-91 1991 Sierra Health Services 6324
24 CNA surety Corp 6351 Oct-97 1997 EMC insurance Group 6331
25 PMI group 6351 1995 1994 Market Corp 6351
26 Farm Family Holdings 6331 1996 1995 Mutual risk management 6331
27 MIIX group 6321 1999 1998 American Financial Corp 6331
28 Riscorp 6331 1996 1995 Merchants Group (nc 6331
29 Scpic Holdings Inc 6351 1997 1996 Ngmagic Inc 6351
30 Allmerica Financial Corp 6331 1995 1994 Progressive Corp 6331
31 Stancorp Financial Group Inc 6321 1999 1998 Fidelity national financial inc 6361
32 Guarantee life companies 6311 Dec-95 1995 Alfa corp 6331
33 NCR1C 6351 1999 1998 Cumberland Technologies Inc 6351
34 John hancock financial 6311 2000 1999 Lincoln national corp 6311
3S Mctlife Inc 6311 2000 1999 Loews 6331
36 Trigon Healthcare Inc 6324 1997 1996 Mid Atlantic Medical Services Inc 6324
37 Old Guard Group Inc 6331 1997 1996 Ohio Casualty Corp 6331
38 WellPoint health Networks Inc 6324 1993 1992 Conseco Inc 6321
39 Amerus Life Insurance 6311 1996 1995 HCC insurance holdings 6331
40 Meemic Holdings Inc 6331 1999 1998 Donegal Group Inc 6331
41 American Physicians Capital Inc 6351 2000 1999 Radian Inc 6351
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
84
exercisable and unexercisable in-the-money options that each company provides in the 
proxy statements.
In order to measure the changes in each CEO’s salary and bonus, I calculate 
the percentage change from the year prior to the IPO to the IPO year and one year 
following, adjusted for inflation. In order to measure the changes in total values of 
annual pay packages, I calculate the percentage change from the year prior to the IPO 
to the IPO year and one year following, adjusted for inflation.
Measurement Procedure
Hypothesis 1 involves determining the relationship between changes in CEO 
salaries and bonuses for formerly mutual versus formerly privately held stock 
companies.
I use analysis of variance to examine whether the type of organization (mutual 
versus privately held stock) can explain the percentage change in salaries and bonuses 
of chief executive officers in the IPO year. The independent variable in this study is 
the percentage increase in salaries and bonuses. The explanatory variable is the type 
of organization.
Due to the limited number of former mutual insurers and privately held stock 
insurers and the skewed underlying distribution of changes in compensation, I employ 
a nonparametric, Wilcoxon signed rank test as recommended by Flores (1989), after 
having excluded obvious outliers to detect whether the salaries and bonuses of top 
executives of formerly privately held stock companies increase and that of top 
executives of former mutual insurers do not significantly increase. The Wilcoxon 
signed rank test assumes that the observations are independent. This test is normally
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used under conditions where the underlying distribution is not normally distributed. 
Earlier studies by McNamara and Rhee (1992), Jain and Kini (1994) also use 
Wilcoxon signed rank test. Hypothesis 2 involves making comparisons between the 
total value of compensation packages of the top executives of former mutual insurers 
for the year preceding the conversion with that of the conversion year and the 
following year. Hypothesis 3 involves making comparisons between the total value of 
compensation packages of the top executives of formerly privately held stock insurers 
for the year preceding the IPO with that of the IPO year and one year following. 
Consequently, the Wilcoxon test is used to test both Hypothesis 2 and 3. I also make 
comparisons between the total value of compensation packages of top executives of 
non-IPO insurers for the year that matches the year preceding the IPO with that of the 
following one and two years. Due to a sufficient number of sample firms, I employ 
the Wilcoxon test and Paired-Samples T test are used to make the comparison. I also 
use analysis of variance to examine whether the going public decision (IPO insurers 
versus non -IPO insurers) can explain the percentage change in the total value of 
compensation packages of the top executives in the IPO year and the following year. 
The independent variable in this study is the percentage change in total value of 
compensation packages. The explanatory variable is the type of insurers (IPO insurers 
and non-IPO insurers).
The IPO insurers in year 0 include 28 formerly privately held stock insurers 
and 18 formerly mutual insurers. The non-IPO insurers include 41 stock companies. 
Due to the unavailability of some data, the IPO insurers in the year subsequent to the 
IPO year include 27 formerly privately held stock insurers and 14 formerly mutual
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insurers. There are 36 non-IPO insurers. The research methodology follows Kaplan 
(1989), Smith (1990), Muscarella and Vestsuypens (1990), Degeorge and Zeckhauser 
(1993), and Jain and Kini (1994). All use the median change in levels because the 
mean is particularly sensitive to outliers.
Results of the Study
This portion of the paper presents the results of the tests of the stated 
hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 proposes that there will be significant increases across the IPO 
event in CEO salaries and bonuses for formerly privately held stock insurance 
companies but not for former mutual insurance company CEOs. The ANOVA results 
are reported in Table 18. The results show that forms of organization can explain the 
changes in chief executive compensation in the IPO year. The change in salaries and 
bonuses is measured relative to the pre-IPO year (year -I).
TABLE 18
The Effects of Forms of Organization on Changes 
in Salaries and Bonuses of CEOs
Forth* IPO year F score Sif Obiervatioas
____________49_________________ 4.079___________ M 49 (Mutual = 19. Stock = 30)
Changes in salaries and bonuses of top executives of formerly privately held 
stock companies for the IPO year (year 0) and the post IPO year (yearl) are reported 
in Tables 19 and 20 respectively. The median change in salaries and bonuses for the
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IPO year and year I are 43.39 % and S9.99 % respectively. Both the increases are 
significant at the 0.01 level. The results appear to support Hypothesis 1 or the notion 
that the reduction in management ownership increases agency costs as described in 
Jensen and Meckling (1976).
TABLE 19
Change in Salaries and Bonuses for Formerly Privately Held 
Stock Insurers CEOs for the IPO Year
Panel A:
No. Coawaay Salary aadBaaas
Y ear-I YearO
1 Liberty financial cos 979,500 1,114,786
2 FPIC 255,671 332,027
3 ESG RE LTD 283,710 526,575
4 Vesta Insurance Group Inc 366,827 526,386
5 Hartford Financial Services 825,000 1,171,962
6 Travelers Aetna Property/Casualty group 2,760,000 3,192,441
7 Allstate Corp 647,500 1,276,578
8 ACE limited 431,573 658,984
9 Renaissancere Holdings Ltd 393,750 468,750
10 Life Re Corp 180,000 531,752
11 MMI Cos Inc 327,600 342,184
12 First Alliance Corp 54,170 73,433
13 Paula Financial 275,000 474,096
14 Cbartwell Re Corp 454,675 664,086
15 RTW Inc 594,431 605,916
16 PMA Capital Corp 1,074,115 1,230,315
17 Rightchoice Managed care inc 384,551 700,138
18 Everest Reinsurance Holdings 1,115,350 1,499,392
19 Oxford Health Plans Inc 191,442 378,731
20 ExelLtd 575,000 653,791
21 Wellcare Management Group Inc 167,505 255,618
22 F B L financial Group Inc 348,123 369,978
23 American Safety Insurance 367,485 386,304
24 standard Management Corp 276,341 365,611
25 Terra Nova Bermuda 850,000 1,050,831
26 Lasalle Re Holdings ltd 352,921 1,024,332
27 United Wisconsin Sevices 337,570 444,885
28 CNA surety Corp 379,219 491,868
29 Triad Guaranty Inc 223,635 276,512
30 PMI group 215,447 310,065
Median 367,156 526,480
Median Increase 4339%
Mean 522,937 713,278
Mean Increase 36.40%
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TABLE 19 (Continued)
PanelB
Year-1 YearO
Median 367,156 526,480
Median Change Relative to Year -1 43.39%
Two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 0.000
Observations 30 30
TABLE 20
Change in Salaries and Bonuses for Formerly 
Privately Held Stock Insurers CEOs for Year I
Panel A
No. Company Salary and Bonus
Year-1 Year 1
1 Liberty financial cos 979,500 1,375,481
2 FPIC 255,671 337,545
3 Vesta Insurance Group Inc 366,827 515,240
4 Hartford Financial Services 825,000 1,713,541
5 travelers Aetna Property/Casualty Group 2,760,000 3,405,638
6 Renaissancere Holdings Ltd 393,750 859,116
7 Life Re Corn 180,000 706,947
8 MMI Cos Inc 327,600 537,247
9 First Alliance Corp 54,170 73,385
10 Paula Financial 275,000 586,895
11 Chartwell Re Corp 454,675 799,946
12 RTW Inc 594,431 599,912
13 PMA Capital Corp 1,074,115 1,203,831
14 Rightchoice Managed care inc 384,551 455,377
15 Everest Reinsurance Holdings 1,115,350 1,524,254
16 Oxford Health Plans Inc 191,442 418,836
17 ExelLtd 575,000 694,924
18 Wellcare Management Group Inc 167,505 288,389
19 F B L financial Group Inc 348,123 407,185
20 American Safety Insurance 367,485 375,722
21 standard Management Corp 276,341 312,269
22 Terra Nova Bermuda 850,000 1,163,711
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TABLE 20 (Continued)
23 Lasalle Re Holdings ltd 352,921 1,093,651
24 United Wisconsin Sc vices 337,570 467,193
25 CNA surety Corp 379,219 601,915
26 Triad Guaranty Inc 223,635 239,024
27 PMI group 215,447 566,264
Median 366,827 586,895
Median Increase 59.99%
Mean 530,568 789,757
Mean Increase 48.85%
Panel B
Year-1 Year 1
Median 366,827 586,895
Median Change Relative to Year -1 59.99%
Two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 0.000
Observations 27 27
Changes in salaries and bonuses of top executives of former mutual insurers 
for the IPO year are reported in Table 21. The median change in salaries and bonuses 
in the IPO year is 33.30 %. However, as I expected, the increase in the IPO year is not 
statistically significant. The findings are supportive of the contention that agency 
costs already exist in mutual organizations. Furthermore, the results tend to support 
the argument that the form of organization can explain the changes in compensation of 
chief executives in the IPO year. The median change in salaries and bonuses in year 
I, which is reported in Table 22, is 18.37%. The increase is significant at 0.05 level.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
90
TABLE 21
Change in Salaries and Bonuses for Former 
Mutual Insurers CEOs for the IPO Year
Panel A:
No. Company Salary and Bonus
Year-1 YearO
1 Farm Family Holdinigs 240,000 388,132
2 MIIX group 578,606 408,023
3 Riscorp 6,329,583 1,611,912
4 Scpie Holdings Inc 516,262 891,080
5 Mony 1,535,000 1,612,903
6 Allmerica Financial Coip 1,125,000 1,510,721
7 Stancorp Financial Group Inc 615,560 849,804
8 Guarantee life companies 615,700 631,106
9 NCRIC 315,000 322,896
10 John hancock financial 3,000,000 2,862,669
11 Metlife Inc 3,714,200 4,255,319
12 Trigon Healthcare Inc 650,000 1,207,234
13 Old Guard Group Inc 207,274 216,924
14 W eilpoint health Networks Inc 907,650 820,541
15 Amerus Life Insurance 740,000 845,481
16 Meemic Holdings Inc 425,000 495,667
17 Mutual Assurance 157,890 158,724
18 American Physicians 288,739 725,338
19 Unum 546,346 462,578
Median 615,560 820,541
Median Increase 33.30%
Mean 1,184,622 1,067,213
Mean Increase -9.91%
Panel B:
Y ear-I YearO
Median 615,560 820,541
Median Change Relative to Year -1 33.30%
Two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 0.117
Observations 19 19
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TABLE 22
Change in Salaries and Bonuses for 
Former Mutual Insurers CEOs for Year 1
Panel A:
No. Company Salary and Bonus
Year-1 Year 1
1 Farm Family Holdings 240,000 453,767
2 MIIX group 578,606 342,655
3 Scpie Holdings Inc 516,262 920,309
4 Mony 1,535,000 1,683,715
5 Allmerica Financial Coip 1,125,000 2,527,666
6 Stancorp Financial Group Inc 615,560 988,883
7 Guarantee life companies 615,700 550,473
8 NCRIC 315,000 283,890
9 Trigon Healthcare Inc 650,000 1,444,628
10 Old Guard Group Inc 207,274 258,261
11 WellPoint health Networks Inc 907,650 863,095
12 Amenis Life Insurance 740,000 949,968
13 Meemic Holdings Inc 425,000 481,193
14 Mutual Assurance 157,890 168,077
Median 597,083 706,784
Median Increase 18.37%
Mean 616,353 851,184
Mean Increase 38.10%
Panel B:
Year-1 Year I
Median 597,083 706,784
Median Change Relative to Year -1 18.37%
Two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 0.048
Observations 14 14
Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 proposes that for former mutual insurance company CEOs, the 
changes in total values of annual pay packages (i.e., salary and bonus, stock 
appreciation rights, stock options, etc ) across demutualization will be statistically 
significant. Changes in the total value of annual compensation packages of top
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executives of former mutual insurers are reported in Tables 23 and 24. The median 
change in total value of annual compensation packages for the IPO year and year 1 are 
105.77 % and 138.61% respectively.
TABLE 23
Change in Total Values of Annual Pay Packages 
for Former Mutual Insurers CEOs for the IPO Year
Panel A:
No. Company Total Values o f Annual Pay Packages
Year-1 YearO
1 Farm Family Holdinigs 265,449 430,924
2 MIIX group 599,146 1,375,064
3 Riscorp 6,389,839 2,753.197
4 Scpie Holdings Inc 552,051 929,246
5 Mony 2,905,852 2,918.170
6 Allmerica Financial Corp 1,419,324 1,978,215
7 Stancorp Financial Group Inc 791,325 1,987,468
8 Guarantee life companies 628,304 667,236
9 NCRIC 332,432 367,534
10 John hancock financial 3,984,202 4,419,907
11 Metlife Inc 7,391,543 8,946,269
12 Trigon Healthcare Inc 692,196 1,400,086
13 Old Guard Group Inc 223,596 520,936
14 WellPoint health Networks Inc 1,378,799 1,342,183
15 Aments Life Insurance 1,092,000 1,215,613
16 Meemic Holdings Inc 613,374 835,659
17 Mutual Assurance 178,692 179,661
18 American Physicians 309,361 1,464,552
Median 660,250 1,358,624
Median Increase 105.77%
Mean 1,652,638 1,873,996
Mean Increase 13.39%
Panel B
1 Year-1 YearO
M edian 660,250 1,358,624
[Median Change Relative to Year -1 105.77%
[Two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 0.006
{Observations 18
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TABLE 24
Change in Total Values of Annual Pay 
Packages for Former Mutual Insurers 
CEOs for Year I
Panel A:
No. Company Total Values o f Annual Pay Packages
Year-1 Year I
1 Farm Family Holdings 265.449 1,245,061
2 MUX group 599,146 715380
3 Scpie Holdings Inc 552,051 960,332
4 Mony 2,905,852 5,668,176
5 Albnerica Financial Corp 1,419,324 3,219,455
6 Stancorp Financial Group Inc 791,325 6,673,879
7 Guarantee life companies 628,304 3,439,689
8 NCRIC 332,432 417,075
9 Trigon Healthcare Inc 692,196 9374,768
10 Old Guard Group Inc 223,596 520,936
11 W ellpoint health Networks Inc 1,378,799 1,717,695
12 Amerus Life Insurance 1,092,000 2,755,243
13 Meemic Holdings Inc 613,374 1,170,718
14 Mutual Assurance 178,692 190,382
Median 620,839 1,481,378
Median Increase 138.61%
Mean 833,753 2,712,056
Mean Increase 225.28%
Panel B:
Year-1 Year 1
Median 620,839 1,481,378
Median Change Relative to Year -1 138.61%
Two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 0.001
Observations 14 14
The increases in the IPO year and year 1 are both significant at the 0.01 level. 
However the median change in the total value of annual compensation pay packages 
of top executives of the control group for the IPO year and year I portrayed in Table 
25 are 16.94 % and 30.96 % respectively. Both increases are insignificant. The
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TABLE 25
Change in Total Values of Annual Pay Packages for 
the Control Group (Non-IPO Insurers)
• year-1 yearO y earl
1 Protective life con) 1,450,717 1,657,661 2,591,221
2 Meridian insurance group 803,401 974,404 654,604
3 Fremont general corp 4,337,512 4.456,309
4 Argonaut Group 5,354,188 7,100,296 5,808,562
5 Southern security life insurance 257,550 249,077 243,642
6 Commerce Group Inc 8,068,913 6,879,385 2,246,128
7 Chubb corp 5,012,820 5,265,563 8,018,909
8 Maxicare Health plans Inc 1,604,755 3,785,588 9,803,126
9 WR Berkley corp 5,379,904 5,766,700 13,464,228
10 Citizens Inc 250,200 249,409 299,458
11 Market corp 1,672,411 1,959,001 1,864,266
12 American Financial corp 2,937,273 1.666,341 2,716,474
13Nymagic 826,219 518,928 339,250
14 Progressive corp 8,614,258 15,751,445 27,587,656
IS Cumberland Technologies inc 362,500 322,896 228,531
16 Mid Atlantic Medical Services Inc 6,533,579 2,755,964 1,308,187
17M biainc 6,869,020 6,660,367 5,454,343
18 Radian Group Inc 8,561,979 11,460,750
19 Capitol transamerica corp 751,469 1,996,658 1,886,921
20 Independence holding co 964,029 1,181,030 862,217
21 Berkshire hatha way inc new 267,300 291,300 266,123
22 Amwest Insurance Group 510,390 413,908
23 Accel International corp 449,875 297,712 611,563
24 EMC Insurance Group 684,939 662,672 396,900
25 Loews corp 2,104,458 2,127,558
26 Donegal Group Inc 889,930 485,517 614,048
27 Gainsco Inc 1,057,572 1,066,321 928,860
28 Conseco Inc 128,032,154 133,376,619 24,054,458
29 Alfa corp 1,417,516 957,279 1,848,624
30 Mutual Risk Management 3,688,161 2,883,775 5,054,093
31 Danielson Holdings corp 1,046,250 960,603 507,337
32 Ohio Casualty Corp 650,150 1,060,775 774,804
33 Midland co 2,412,405 981,311 2,394,573
34 Fidelity national financial inc 31,274,620 8,558,222 52,066,580
35 Lincoln National corp 6,635,102 21,444,613
36 HCC insurance holdings inc 2,317,691 5.820.560 3,267,412
37IPC holdings ltd 665,686 1,059,319 891,290
38 Merchants group inc 116,422 193,785 215,896
39 Acceptanc insurance cos 1,361,722 1,596,452 2,392,684
40 Siena health services inc 556,744 1,747,523 2,101,651
41 Frontier insurance group 726,600 516,472 776,883
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TABLE 25 (Continued)
Median 1,417,516 1,657,661 1,856,445
[Median Increase Relative to Year-1 16.94% 30.96%
Mean 6,279,961 6,516,099 5,126,153
[Mean Increase Relative to Year-1 3.76% -18.37%
Panel B:
Median
Median Change Relative to Year -1 
Two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 
Paired-Samples T  test 
Observations
Year-1
1,417,516
41
YearO
1,657,661
16.94%
0.257
0.747
41
Year 1 
1,856,445 
30.96% 
0.220 
0.647 
36
results support Hypothesis 2. Thus CEOs of former mutual insurers receive greater 
rewards across demutualization.
Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 proposes that for formerly privately held insurance company 
CEOs, the changes in total value of annual pay packages across initial public offerings 
will be significant. Changes in the total value of annual compensation packages of top 
executives of formerly privately held stock insurers are reported in Tables 26 and 27. 
The median change in total value of compensation packages for the IPO year and year 
1 are 128.96 % and 352.73 %, respectively. Both increases are significant at the 0.01 
level. The results show that CEOs’ rewards of formerly privately held stock insurers 
increase very significantly following IPOs.
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TABLE 26
Change in Total Values of Annual Pay 
Packages for Formerly Privately Held Stock 
Insurers for the IPO Year
Panel A:
No. Company Total Values o f Annual Pay Packages
Y ear-I YearO
1 Liberty financial cost 1,023,868 6,551,050
2 FPIC 279,796 873,007
3 ESG RE LTD 318,205 561,024
4 Vesta Insurance Group Inc 394,163 1,346,157
5 Hartford Financial Services 846,956 18,582,173
6 Travelers Aetna Property 3,887,292 15,541,509
7 Allstate Corp 829,723 3,976,656
8 ACE limited 951,771 3,323,342
9 Renaissancere Holdings Ltd 558,033 2,782,822
10 Life Re Corp 180,000 1,203,465
11 MMI Cos Inc 615,002 520,213
12 First Alliance Corp 115,911 113,134
13 Paula Financial 275,347 6,790,245
14 Chartwell Re Corp 579,176 903405
15 RTW Inc 666,214 695409
16 PMA Capital Corp 1,145,961 3.400,377
17 Rightchoice Managed care inc 536,339 836472
18 Everest Reinsurance Holdings 14,458,668 1,728,641
19 Oxford Health Plans Inc 191,442 378,731
20 Wellcare Management Group Inc 167,505 374,555
21 F B L financial Group Inc 372,785 877447
22 American Safety Insurance 372,285 574415
23 standard Management Corp 284,833 817415
24 Terra Nova Bermuda 950,000 1,484,168
25 Lasalle Re Holdings ltd 499,913 5,823,773
26 CNA surety Corp 420,323 508,843
27 Triad Guaranty Inc 225,883 478,937
28 PMI group 264,699 1443,029
Median 460,118 1,053,485
Median Increase 128.96%
Mean 1,163,411 3,051,497
Mean Increase 16249%
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TABLE 26 (Continued)
Find B:
Year-1 YearO
Median 460,118 1,053,485
Median Change Relative to Year -1 128.96%
Two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 0.000
Observations 28 28
TABLE 27
Change in Total Values of Annual Pay Packages 
for Formerly Privately Held Stock Insurers for Year 1
Panel A:
No. Company Total Values o f Annual Pay Packages
Year-1 Year 1
1 Liberty financial cost 1,023,868 9,750,350
2 FPIC 279,796 2,961,669
3 Vesta Insurance Group Inc 394,163 13.671,528
4 Hartford Financial Services 846,956 21,464,963
5 Travelers Aetna Property 3,887,292 18,908,478
6 Renaissancere Holdings Ltd 558,033 9,721,252
7 Life Re Corp 180,000 1,284,972
8 MMI Cos Inc 615,002 1,170,356
9 First Alliance Corp 115,911 111,081
10 Paula Financial 275,347 608,829
11 Chartwell Re Corp 579,176 1,905,947
12 RTW Inc 666,214 645,509
13 PMA Capital Corp 1,145,961 3,625,561
14 Rightchoice Managed care inc 536,339 561,584
15 Everest Reinsurance Holdings 14,458,668 2,511,758
16 Oxford Health Plans Inc 191,442 11,202,853
17 ExelLtd 915,389 3,000,379
18 Wellcare Management Group Inc 167,505 303,536
19 F B L financial Group Inc 372,785 1,933,653
20 American Safety Insurance 372,285 408,663
21 standard Management Corp 284,833 665,282
22 Term Nova Bermuda 950,000 4,091,416
23 Lasalle Re Holdings ltd 499,913 12,391,086
24 United Wisconsin Sevices 420983 1134757.282
25 CNA surety Corp 420,323 793,349
26 Triad Guaranty Inc 225,883 241,811
27 PMI group 264,699 1,874,566
Median 420,983 1.905,947
Median Increase 352.73%
Mean 1.135.139 4,701,674
Mean Increase 314.19%
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TABLE 27 (Continued)
Panel B:
Year-1 YearO
Median 420,983 1,905,947
Median Change Relative to Year -1 352.73%
Two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 0.000
Observations 27 27
The ANOVA results are reported in Table 28. The results suggest that the 
decision to go public can help explain the changes in chief executive compensation. 
Results are significant at the 0.01 level both in the IPO year and the post IPO year. 
The results reported in TABLE 25 show that the total value of the control group top 
executives’ compensation packages insignificantly increase. The findings are 
supportive of Hypotheses 2 and 3 or the contention that CEOs make the transition of 
firms from private or mutual to public ownership to increase their own rewards.
TABLE 28
The Effects of the Going Public Decision on Changes 
in Total Values of Annual Pay Packages 
for Years 0 and Year 1
F Score Sig Observations
YearO 8.422 0.005 87 (41Non-IPOInsurers, 46 IPO Insurers)
Year 1 9.048 0.004 77 (36 Non IPO Insurers, 41 IPO Insurers)
Discussion and Conclusions 
The managers of formerly privately held stock insurers represent the group 
whose ownership is reduced when their firms go public. The results show that the 
total values of annual pay packages for this group significantly increase following
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IPOs and their salaries and bonuses significantly increase in the IPO year. This study 
supports the findings of other researchers (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Walkling and 
Long (1984), Mikkelson and Partch (1985), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988)) that 
reduced ownership retention by managers increases agency costs. As mentioned 
earlier, before IPOs, top executives consider their compensation as expenses (Gilles 
(1999)). They have to select the level of both firm value and rewards that maximize 
their utility (Wells, Cox, and Gaver (1995)). When outside equity is issued, they 
increase their rewards at the expense o f the new owners.
Top executives’ salaries and bonuses for former mutual insurers do not 
significantly increase, but the total values of their annual pay packages significantly 
increase following IPOs. The results support previous empirical studies that agency 
costs already occur in mutual organizations (O’Hara (1981), Mayers and Smith (1981, 
1986, 1988, 1992), Lamm-Tennant and Starks (1993), Fama and Jensen (1983b), 
Fields and Tirtiroglu (1991), and Kroll et al. (1993)). Before IPOs, the managers of 
mutual insurers use their positions to boost their compensation in the form of salaries 
and bonuses at the expense of the po licyho lder-owners. Then they foster their 
personal benefits in the form of stock- based compensation across demutualization.
In conclusion, the results indicate that agency problems occur at the time of an 
IPO. I can conclude that one of the reasons senior managers decide to convert their 
companies is to boost their personal benefits. The results are consistent with the 
previous empirical studies that find that top executives tend to pursue strategies that 
increase their personal rewards (Gomez-Mejia, Tosi, and Hinkin (1987), Hetherington 
(1969), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Kroll, Wright, and Theerathom (1993), and
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Wright et al. (1996)). The results also support empirical studies that find that without 
a market for corporate control, managers of mutual organizations have a most 
opportunity to use their positions to ultimately increase their personal rewards.
Limitations and Contributions 
The small sample size for each form of organization limits the extent to which 
the results may be generalized. Given this limitation of the study, I still believe that 
this study makes contributions to agency issues related to executive compensation and 
form of organization. There have been no empirical studies examining the 
relationship between initial public offerings and executive rewards. Some researchers 
have investigated whether corporate acquisitions are driven by the interests of senior 
executives (Kroll, Wright, Toombs, and Leavell (1997), Chung and Wright (1998), 
and Chung, Wright, and Charoenwong (1998)). Some studies (Jain and Kini (1994), 
Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah (1997), Shelor and Anderson (1998), McNamara and 
Rhee (1992)) examine the change in operating performance of companies as they 
make the transition from private or mutual to public ownership. This study provides 
substantial support for the importance o f the role of ownership structure in controlling 
agency costs. This paper is the first to shed light on how compensation changes 
following initial public offerings vary across two kinds of firms that differ in agency 
characteristics: mutual and privately held stock insurance companies.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
This dissertation is a collection of three research essays examining (1) 
operating performance of property/casualty insurance companies following initial 
public offerings, (2) an event study of initial public offerings of insurance companies, 
and (3) an examination of the benefits for privately held and mutual insurers’ CEOs 
following initial public offerings. This dissertation increases the body of knowledge 
about the impact of initial public offerings on insurance companies.
Chapter 2 shows that following initial public offerings, the underwriting 
performance, the solvency performance, and the overall performance of 
property/casualty insures do improve while the investment performance deteriorates.
Chapter 3 shows that abnormal returns exist at the time of an initial public 
offerings for property/casualty insurers and for combined insurers, but not for life 
insurers. There is a significant difference among the abnormal returns of 
property/casualty insurers and other non-regulated companies. Also, there is a 
significant difference in the abnormal returns of combined insurers and other non­
regulated companies. The results indicate that abnormal returns o f insurance 
companies are less than abnormal returns of other non-regulated firms following 
initial public offerings.
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Chapter 4 provides that there is evidence of agency problems at the time of an 
initial public offering. The salaries, bonuses, and total value of annual pay packages 
for formerly privately held stock insurers significantly increase following initial public 
offerings. Therefore, reduced ownership by management increases agency costs. 
That salaries and bonuses of former mutual insurers do not significantly increase in the 
IPO year is evidence that top executives of mutual insurers may have already abused 
their position before demutualization. The result shows that after demutualizaton, top 
executives of former mutual insurers foster their personal benefits in the form of 
stock-based compensation.
Implications of the Study
Understanding the impacts of initial public offerings on insurance companies 
which operate in a regulated industry is important for both insurance regulators and 
customers. The analysis in chapter 2 suggests that investment performance of 
property/casualty insurance companies declines following initial public offerings, so 
property/casualty insurers should be careful about their investment policy.
The results in chapter 3 suggest that abnormal returns exist at the time of an 
initial public offering, even in a regulatory environment which has less asymmetric 
information than other industries. The results in chapter 4 suggest that there is 
evidence of agency problems at the time of an initial public offerings. The results 
suggest that top executives of mutual insurers have the most opportunity to act 
abusively. Therefore, policyholders of mutual companies should pay more attention to 
the management of the company. Currently, more than 50% of policyholders do not 
vote in company elections. An appropriate demutualization process prevents
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management from channeling wealth from policyholders. The regulatory authorities 
must give approval to the demutualization plan. Policyholders will be provided 
detailed information about the demutualization and what they will receive in exchange 
for their ownership rights. For the company to be able to convert, the policyholders 
must approve the change. Regulators and policyholders should not approve a plan that 
channels wealth from policyholders to management. Often, policyholders are 
convinced that demutualization will reap rewards in the form of a lump sum of money 
and rising stock prices. Policyholder diligence will prevent the shifting of costs from 
top management of mutual insurers to themselves and to society.
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